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Article

Inflammatory Speech: Offense Versus
Incitement
Alexander Tsesis

†

INTRODUCTION
First Amendment jurisprudence has produced a tense in1
terplay between libertarian and public safety concerns. While
the Supreme Court has typically found content restrictions on
2
speech to infringe the individual right to self-expression, it has
also determined that the regulation of intentional intimidation,
3
group defamation, and advice to terrorists are constitutional.
These contrasting emphases on liberty and safety have been evident from the differing treatments of outrageous and threatening speech.
Most recently, the Court ruled in favor of belligerent funeral protestors’ expressive interests over a mourner’s claim
that he suffered severe emotional distress from their bellicosi4
ty. On a separate matter, the Court found that there is no
† Associate Professor of Law, Loyola University Chicago School of Law.
I am grateful for the advice of Ian Bartrum, John Bronsteen, Laura Cisneros,
Danielle Citron, Jessie Hill, Roberta Kwall, Marcia McCormick, Helen Norton,
Karen Petroski, and Ofer Raban. Copyright © 2013 by Alexander Tsesis.
1. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Two Concepts of Freedom of Speech, 124
HARV. L. REV. 143, 144–45 (2010) (discussing the political liberty and political
equality approaches to the First Amendment); Alexander Tsesis, SelfGovernment and the Declaration of Independence, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 693,
739–51 (2012) [hereinafter Tsesis, Self-Government] (explaining how principles of the Declaration of Independence impact First Amendment standards
related to freedom and participation).
2. See Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (“[T]he First
Amendment means that the government has no power to restrict expression
because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”).
3. See, e.g., Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2731
(2010) (upholding the constitutionality of a statute that criminalizes the knowing supply of material support to foreign terrorist organizations); Virginia v.
Black, 538 U.S. 343, 363 (2003) (upholding state cross burning statute because
of the symbol’s link to the Ku Klux Klan).
4. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1218–19 (2011).
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compelling state reason to label violent video games in order to
5
prevent their distribution to minors. In both cases, the Court
found that the Constitution protects provocative and insensi6
tive speech, even when it causes others grief and anger. These
holdings were in keeping with the Court’s traditional doctrine
that speech cannot be criminalized solely because of its offen7
sive content.
The nearly categorical proscription against interfering with
expressions that elicit negative emotional responses stands in
sharp contrast to the deference the Court has shown to states’
policies prohibiting organizations or individuals from spreading
messages meant to incite others to commit harmful actions.
Contrary to accepted lore in much academic literature, the Supreme Court has on several occasions recognized that some
public safety concerns warrant state regulations on threatening
8
expressions, even when they pose no imminent threat of harm.
The modern judicial trend is to defer to public policies that curb
incitement, group defamation, and material support to organi9
zations whose stated purposes are violent.
This bifurcation between offensive and threatening speech
more accurately explains the Court’s contextual approach than
the accepted belief among many prominent First Amendment
scholars, such as Professors Steven Gey and Daniel Farber,
that absent a showing of immediate harm courts must find content regulations against incitement to be facially unconstitu10
tional. Judicially recognized limits on cross burning and the
funding of terrorist organizations also run counter to Dean
Robert Post’s assertion that the First Amendment bars the en5. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738 (2011).
6. Id. at 2733; Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1215.
7. See United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1584 (2010).
8. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2731; Black, 538 U.S. at 363.
9. See, e.g., Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2731; Black, 538
U.S. at 363.
10. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, The Categorical Approach to Protecting
Speech in American Constitutional Law, 84 IND. L.J. 917, 925 (2009) (“[I]t can
hardly be viewed as a surprise that the government is entitled to prevent individuals from threatening an individual or the public with immediate violence.”); Steven G. Gey, A Few Questions About Cross Burning, Intimidation,
and Free Speech, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1287, 1294 (2005) [hereinafter Gey,
Questions About Cross Burning] (“The . . . First Amendment issue involves the
bedrock principle that political advocacy is protected from government regulation unless the advocacy takes the form of incitement, the advocacy occurs in a
context where an immediate concrete harm follows from the speech in question, and the speaker intends his or her speech to instigate the immediate
harm.”).
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actment of statutes that differentiate between “harmful” and
11
“beneficial ideas.” To the contrary, states can prohibit speech
12
that threatens public peace precisely because of its content.
First Amendment jurisprudence contains a clear demarcation
between restraints on statements tending to offend and those
13
intrinsically dangerous to public safety. Without first examining evidence about what the speaker meant to convey, a court
cannot make that distinction. In upholding restrictions on intimidating speech, the Supreme Court resorts to neither the
imminent threat of harm nor the strict scrutiny tests. Instead,
its constitutional assessment is more comprehensive, delving
into whether the stated reasons for regulations implicate sub14
stantial interests in public security and safety.
Some journalists disapproved of regulations on speech that
posed no imminent threat of harm. Several popular media outlets expressed visceral opposition to Holder v. Humanitarian
Law Project (HLP), which upheld a federal ban against giving
15
material support to designated foreign terrorist organizations.
An anonymous editorial in the Washington Post asserted that
the holding would give the federal government sweeping power
to criminalize the contacting of terrorist organizations even if
the aim of the communication were to help negotiate a cessa16
tion of violence. A Los Angeles Times editorial took a decidedly
textualist approach to the First Amendment, asserting that the
majority in HLP had “[d]isregard[ed] the dictionary as well as
11. See Robert Post, Participatory Democracy and Free Speech, 97 VA. L.
REV. 477, 484 (2011) (asserting that the political presumption of equal, individual autonomy “underwrites the First Amendment doctrine’s refusal to distinguish between good and bad ideas, true or false ideas, or harmful or beneficial ideas”).
12. See Black, 538 U.S. at 363 (“[J]ust as a State may regulate only that
obscenity which is the most obscene due to its prurient content, so too may a
State choose to prohibit only those forms of intimidation that are most likely
to inspire fear of bodily harm.”).
13. Compare Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1219 (2011) (“Such speech
cannot be restricted simply because it is upsetting or arouses contempt.”), with
Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2728 (holding that the statute does
not violate the First Amendment “[g]iven the sensitive interests in national
security and foreign affairs at stake”).
14. See, e.g., Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2727 (asserting that
the “evaluation of the facts by the Executive . . . is entitled to deference [because t]his litigation implicates sensitive and weighty interests of national security and foreign affairs”).
15. See id. at 2731.
16. Editorial, Material Error: The Court Goes Too Far in the Name of
Fighting Terrorism, WASH. POST, June 22, 2010, at A18.
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17

the Constitution.” On the constitutional side, these editorials
did not distinguish between protected speech that some listeners find to be outrageous and unprotected speech that facilitates the commission of violent crimes; a distinction on which
this Article focuses. On the political side, these editorials ignored an organization’s ability to be taken off the designated
18
list by desisting from terror. On the material side, the criticisms discounted the fungibility of funds contributed for nonviolent activities, freeing up a terrorist group’s ability to exploit
19
other resources to commit acts of violence.
This is the first article to clearly describe the constitutional
distinctions between the Supreme Court’s divergent approach
to affective and intimidating communications. Although the
liberty interest of non-violent groups is protected by the First
Amendment even when it crosses into indecency, state and federal governments can regulate speech that threatens the safety
of others. Hurt feelings are not legally cognizable harms. On
the other hand, speech that poses a threat is beyond the ambit
of free speech protections.
Part I of the Article surveys the Supreme Court’s recent
guidance on the constitutional value of offensive, emotionally
charged speech. In this area, the Court has opted to protect
speakers’ expressive interests. Part II distinguishes offensive
expressions from those that threaten others’ well-being, dignity, or security. After describing the evolution of jurisprudence
dealing with the regulation of inflammatory speech, I take up
the special case of digital communications, which are disseminated in a realm where the imminent threat of harm and
fighting words tests have little relevance. When reviewing regulations against purposeful threats, the Court has recognized
several categories of content regulations that have historically
20
withstood judicial scrutiny. Part III argues against the view of
those First Amendment scholars who believe restrictions on
17. Editorial, Terror and Free Speech, L.A. TIMES, June 22, 2010, at A12.
18. Federal statute requires the State Department to periodically review
whether a group should continue to be designated a foreign terrorist organization. See 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(4)(B)(ii) (2006).
19. See Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2727 (“The State Department informs us that ‘[t]he experience and analysis of the U.S. government agencies charged with combating terrorism strongly suppor[t]’ Congress’s finding that all contributions to foreign terrorist organizations further
their terrorism.”).
20. See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544 (2012) (plurality
opinion).
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group defamation, hate symbols, and material support of ter21
rorists violate the First Amendment.
I. EMOTIVE AND OFFENSIVE EXPRESSIONS
A. OFFENSIVE SPEECH
The judiciary has played a central role in safeguarding the
rights of speakers to make statements even when the content
22
offends audiences. This doctrinal tradition is not derived from
the literal wording of the First Amendment, which explicitly
23
only prohibits Congress from abridging free speech. The Court
regards obnoxious and degrading speech to be presumptively
protected from content-based restrictions that can infringe
First Amendment rights.
Snyder v. Phelps, the first of three recent cases on constitutionally protected offensive speech, arose from a funeral protest
by the pastor and parishioners of the Westboro Baptist
24
Church. Participants displayed signs with messages, such as
“God Hates the USA/Thank God for 9/11” and “God Hates
Fags,” in protest of the United States’ tolerance of homosexu21. In a recent article Professor Jeremy Waldron explained how and why
group defamation statutes further the legitimate public interest in maintaining a “well-ordered society.” Jeremy Waldron, Dignity and Defamation: The
Visibility of Hate, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1596, 1626–30 (2010) (“[W]hen people call
for the sort of assurance to which hate speech laws might make a contribution,
it is not on the controversial details of justice. Instead, it is on some of the
most elementary fundamentals—that all are equally human and have the dignity of humanity, that all have an elementary entitlement to justice, and that
all deserve protection from the most egregious forms of violence, exclusion,
and subordination.”). The Canadian Supreme Court has made a similar point
in an opinion upholding a restriction on hate propaganda:
[Hate propaganda] undermines the dignity and self-worth of target
group members and, more generally, contributes to disharmonious relations among various racial, cultural and religious groups, as a result eroding the tolerance and open-mindedness that must flourish in
a multicultural society which is committed to the idea of equality.
Taylor v. Canadian Human Rights Comm’n, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 892, 894 (Can.).
22. In the landmark Hustler Magazine v. Falwell decision, the Court
unanimously held that proof of malice was needed to prove a tort of intentional infliction of severe emotional distress about a matter of public concern. 485
U.S. 46, 56 (1988).
23. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging
the freedom of speech . . . .”). The Court signaled in 1938 that free speech
would be one of the categories it would give “more exacting judicial scrutiny”
against state abuse. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144,
152 n.4 (1938).
24. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1213–14 (2011).
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25

als. After Westboro picketed a deceased soldier’s funeral, his
father, Albert Snyder, filed a lawsuit in which he claimed their
antics caused him to suffer “severe and lasting emotional inju26
ry.” The protesters confined themselves to public land, in
27
keeping with police orders for staging the demonstration. Protestors did not enter the cemetery, used no violence, and did
28
not yell or use any profanity.
The district court, nevertheless, found them liable for intentional infliction of emotional distress, intrusion into seclu29
sion, and civil conspiracy. The court of appeals reversed on
30
First Amendment grounds. The Supreme Court, then, upheld
the appellate court’s decision, finding that the distress occasioned by the picketing “turned on the content and viewpoint of
the message conveyed, rather than any interference with the
31
funeral itself.”
The Court made clear that the liberty to express a political
viewpoint was not actionable solely “because it is upsetting or
32
arouses contempt.” The First Amendment shields speech even
when it is made under circumstances that some people might
33
find to be hurtful or misguided. The decision was in keeping
with the established distinction between narrowly tailored regulations that further compelling government purposes, like deterring violence, and overbroad prohibitions that are meant to
safeguard emotional sensitivities by restraining speakers from
uttering unpleasant or even uncivil statements. Government is
prohibited from showing favoritism to the viewpoint of one individual over another, even when the expressed message has
34
an unpleasant impact on the audience.
Had the plaintiff in Snyder been a captive audience to the
protest, unable to avoid it, some government regulation would
25. Id. at 1213.
26. Id. at 1222 (Alito, J., dissenting).
27. Id. at 1213 (majority opinion).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1214.
30. Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 226 (4th Cir. 2009).
31. Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1219.
32. Id.
33. See, e.g., Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos.,
515 U.S. 557, 574 (1995) (“[T]he point of all speech protection . . . is to shield
just those choices of content that in someone’s eyes are misguided, or even
hurtful.”).
34. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48–49 (1976) (per curiam) (stating
that government cannot restrict speech in order to raise the profile of more
favored points of view).
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35

have been warranted. But at the time of the funeral the
Westboro protesters were 1000 feet away, and the plaintiff
could not read their signs nor make out what they were say36
ing. He only later found out details through a news report
37
about the event.
The physical distance between them was only one important contextual fact. The protesters meant to shock the con38
science but not to intimidate Snyder’s entourage. Without any
contemporaneous awareness of the message, Snyder was una39
ble to prove the picketers were intentionally threatening him.
Whether the Court’s decision is regarded from Dean Robert
40
Post’s democratic value of free speech or Professor Edwin
41
Baker’s autonomy perspective, the Westboro community’s
right to publically present their views on a controversial subject
was intrinsic to the speech values of the First Amendment. The
protestors did not threaten the democratic order; to the contrary, they were exercising their rights to political speech and selfexpression.
There is nothing novel about the conclusion that outrageous, non-menacing speech is protected by the First Amendment. The Snyder majority’s dismissiveness that statements
made at a distance can be threatening is, however, suspect. The
key question, as I will show in Part III, is whether the speaker
means to intimidate, defame, or advance criminal conduct.
35. The court sparingly applies the captive audience doctrine. Snyder, 131
S. Ct. at 1220; Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975) (describing
circumstances in which the government can selectively censor offensive expression because “the degree of captivity makes it impractical for the unwilling viewer or auditor to avoid exposure”).
36. Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1213–14.
37. Id.
38. One indicator that church members did not intimidate mourners was
that Westboro notified the authorities of their intent to picket and then followed police orders throughout the demonstration. Id. at 1213. Bringing police
into event planning reduced the risk of physical altercation.
39. See Danielle Keats Citron & Helen Norton, Intermediaries and Hate
Speech: Fostering Digital Citizenship for Our Information Age, 91 B.U. L. REV.
1435, 1463 (2011) (describing a context-specific analysis for evaluating whether outrageous, humiliating, and intrusive speech can be said to result in the
intentional infliction of emotional distress).
40. See Post, supra note 11, at 482–83 (explaining why free speech protections are best understood to be democracy enhancing rather than autonomy
oriented).
41. C. Edwin Baker, Is Democracy a Sound Basis for a Free Speech Principle?, 97 VA. L. REV. 515, 522, 526 (2011) (asserting that the key feature of
free speech is autonomy, within the context of political speech and outside of
it).
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Those offenses may be committed even where speaker and target are not in close proximity. For instance, when threats are
posted on the Internet, a billboard, or school blackboard, the object of the message might come across the message later, or not
at all, but the forewarning of harm may be no less real. In
Snyder, no such threat was involved, but where the intent is to
intimidate another, even at some future time, the potential for
harm is elevated. Professor Kenneth L. Karst has pointed out
that even when death threats are made from afar they can re42
sult in long-term anxieties and traumas. If members of the
Westboro Church had gone beyond obnoxious and callous
statements to intentional threats against the funeral proces43
sion, they might have been held criminally liable. The precedential value of Snyder, then, should be limited to circumstances when picketers do not mean to threaten a public audience.
B. DEPICTIONS OF CRUELTY
Snyder falls into a line of precedents that protect “disa44
45
greeable” or “scurrilous” speech, even when such communi46
cation “stirs people to anger.” Neither a community’s sense of
morality nor individual sensibilities can gainsay the liberty interest of an individual to make a statement, even one that
many would deem to be inappropriate and disgusting. A closely
related category protects repulsive audio-visual depictions.
In a 2010 case, United States v. Stevens, the Court struck
down a federal statute prohibiting the creation, sale, and possession of videos depicting animal cruelty, finding that the law
47
was impermissibly overbroad. In its brief, the United States

42. See Kenneth L. Karst, Threats and Meanings: How the Facts Govern
First Amendment Doctrine, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1337, 1342 (2006).
43. See infra text accompanying notes 74–76.
44. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (“If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”).
45. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 22 (1971) (explaining a First
Amendment challenge to a state law against “offensive conduct” in public discourse).
46. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949) (overturning a conviction
under a disorderly conduct law).
47. 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1584, 1592 (2010). The majority found the statute to
be overbroad and did not decide whether a similar statute limited to depictions
of animal cruelty would be permissible. Id. The dissent, on the other hand,
thought the Court mischaracterized the case as dealing with speech rather
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asserted that “[l]ike obscenity, the depictions [of human cruelty
to animals] are of patently offensive conduct that appeals only
48
to the basest instincts.” Similarly, the Humane Society’s amicus brief compared crush videos to obscenity, asserting that
“[l]ike depraved sexual materials banned by obscenity laws,
crush and dogfighting videos are ‘patently offensive,’ lack serious social value, and appeal to base human instincts rather
49
than conveying any ideas or information.”
The majority in Stevens, however, rejected the government’s comparison of offensive speech to sexually prurient ma50
terial. The Court’s differentiation between depictions of animal violence and obscenity was predicated on judicial
51
exclusivity in the interpretation of the Constitution : under its
doctrinal framework, only the judiciary can identify which expressions do or do not qualify as speech for First Amendment
purposes. Congress, on the other hand, is prohibited from using
52
cost-benefit analysis or moralism for regulating speech. The
Court in Stevens also distinguished the depiction of cruelty to
animals from the narrow class of communications that go beyond the aegis of the First Amendment, including the incite53
54
ment to imminent lawlessness, group defamation, child por55
56
nography, and solicitation to commit a crime. Unlike
criminal laws prohibiting actual cruelty to animals, the federal
law that the Court struck down in Stevens targeted only the
57
distribution of its depiction.
than cruel acts committed to animals. Id. at 1592 (Alito, J., dissenting). For
the dissent, the case was about conduct, not speech.
48. Brief for the United States at 9, Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577 (No. 08-769).
49. Brief of Amicus Curiae the Humane Society of the United States in
Support of Petitioner at 21, Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577 (No. 08-769).
50. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1584–86.
51. See Alexander Tsesis, Principled Governance: The American Creed
and Congressional Authority, 41 CONN. L. REV. 679, 731 (2009) (arguing that
judicial intrusion into legislative enforcement authority violates the framing
principle of self-government).
52. See Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1586 (noting that categories of free speech
falling outside of First Amendment protection are not upheld on cost-benefit
grounds).
53. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam).
54. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952).
55. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 754–63 (1982).
56. United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 298 (2008).
57. The federal statute the Court found to be unconstitutional in Stevens
grew out of a nationwide concern. The law prohibited the creation, sale, and
possession of “a depiction of animal cruelty with the intention of placing that
depiction in interstate or foreign commerce for commercial gain.” 18 U.S.C.
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While Stevens like Snyder dealt with offensive speech,
there was a key, overlooked difference between the two. In Stevens the depiction of animal cruelty required the previous
commission of a violent act that is illegal in all United States
58
jurisdictions, while Snyder was a pure speech case. Despite
this clear distinction, which might have led to different re59
sults, the unifying premise in both decisions is that offensive
and outrageous speech is protected where it is made without
any intent to intimidate or solicit criminal conduct. The majority’s error in Stevens was to discount past criminality in the test
for communicative legitimacy.
Self-expression with no intent to instigate criminal conduct, which was at play in Stevens and Snyder, was also central
in a 2010 Supreme Court term decision. In Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n, the Supreme Court rejected California’s attempt to prohibit the electronic distribution of violent
60
content to children. The Court invalidated a state regulation
against renting and selling violent video games to minors that
are “patently offensive to prevailing standards in the communi61
ty.” Like videos depicting cruelty to animals, the Court did not
regard violent electronic games to be analogous to obscenity be62
cause no violent intent was involved in the games. Like
Snyder, the expressive conduct of renting and selling violent
video games was not interwoven with criminality, as it was in
Stevens, but the Court did not revisit the latter decision. The
§ 48(a) (2000) (reenacted as Pub. L. 111-294 § 3(c), 124 Stat. 3179 (2010)). The
District of Columbia and all fifty states have statutes prohibiting the cruel
treatment of animals. United States v. Stevens, 533 F.3d 218, 223 (3d Cir.
2008). Stevens was convicted in Pennsylvania but lived in Virginia. In Pennsylvania, cruelty to animals includes “wantonly or cruelly” abusing or neglecting an animal over “which he has a duty of care.” 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5511(c)
(2007). Likewise, the abandonment of an animal or deprivation of “sustenance,
drink, shelter or veterinary care, or access to clean and sanitary shelter which
will protect the animal against inclement weather and preserve the animal’s
body heat and keep it dry” are also criminally actionable. Id.
58. All fifty states and the District of Columbia have statutes against cruelty to animals. See Stevens, 533 F.3d at 223 n.4 (listing citations to state and
District of Columbia animal cruelty statutes).
59. Justice Alito regarded the case to be about conduct rather than
speech. United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1592 (2010) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“The Court strikes down in its entirety a valuable statute, 18 U.S.C.
§ 48, that was enacted not to suppress speech, but to prevent horrific acts of
animal cruelty—in particular, the creation and commercial exploitation of
‘crush videos,’ a form of depraved entertainment that has no social value.”).
60. 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2742 (2011).
61. Id. at 2732, 2742.
62. Id. at 2734.
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Court in Entertainment Merchants found that California lacked
a compelling reason to enact a value laden content regulation,
even when the law was based on its parens patriae power over
63
children’s welfare.
The holdings in Stevens and Entertainment Merchants are
closely linked to the Snyder decision barring regulation of disturbing and outrageous expression. All three rulings were
based on the principle that offensive, detestable, and even revolting speech is protected where there is no intent to instigate
64
violence or intimidate the public. While Stevens misapplied
the principle to expression arising from actual rather than fictional criminal conduct, the ruling accurately reflects the facial
First Amendment doctrine. This fairly well settled area of law
is in sharp contrast to the often heated disputes about the legitimacy of regulations that target belligerent, instigative, and
hate speech. As we will see in Part II, the Court has been more
deferential of content regulations on self-expression that are
fashioned to maintain public safety and to protect private reputation.
II. INFLAMMATORY SPEECH
In Snyder, Stevens, and Entertainment Merchants, the
Court relied on the well-established premise that speech is a
fundamental interest, protected even when it is offensive. The
constitutional right to unencumbered private speech outweighs
hurt feelings and moralistic concerns. The Court distinguishes
this form of communication from intentionally intimidating
statements; with regulations of the latter, it is the civic interest
in safety that outweighs expressive liberty. Even then, the
prosecution bears a heavy burden of proof because a risk exists
of government intrusion. While criminal regulation of incitement requires proof of intent, the Court recognizes the social
interest in protecting civil order against public disturbances
65
likely to instigate fist fights. The extent to which states can
63. Id. at 2735–36.
64. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIES 952, 999 (2d ed. 2002). The Court has found the same protection for
violent depictions of cruelty to animals and gory video games as it had earlier
for displaying the emotive words “Fuck the Draft” in a courthouse, Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971), and the burning a flag at a rally, Texas v.
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989).
65. The Court has explicitly rejected
the view that freedom of speech and association . . . as protected by
the First and Fourteenth Amendments, are ‘absolutes,’ not only in the
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restrict individuals from displaying hate symbols, uttering racist epithets, and advising terrorists has caused a great deal of
academic and judicial controversy.
A. HISTORICAL DIMENSIONS
From its earliest developments following the First World
War, First Amendment jurisprudence addressed the question of
whether states can prohibit incitement. Three cases that arose
66
from prosecutions under the Espionage Act of 1917 —Schenck
67
68
v. United States, Frohwerk v. United States, and Debs v.
69
United States —established the groundwork for contemporary
doctrine. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. drafted all three
majority opinions. Schenck remains the most influential of this
trilogy.
Charles T. Schenck was criminally convicted under a federal statute that prohibited interference with the U.S. effort to
70
recruit soldiers during the First World War. Evidence at trial
showed that Schenck had intentionally mailed pamphlets, urg71
ing young men to resist military conscription. The Court upheld his conviction and, more importantly for posterity, developed the “clear and present danger” test for reviewing cases of
72
incitement. It allowed for limitations on speech when there
undoubted sense that where the constitutional protection exists it
must prevail, but also in the sense that the scope of that protection
must be gathered solely from a literal reading of the First Amendment.
Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 49 (1961); see also Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942) (“[I]t is well understood that the
right of free speech is not absolute at all times and under all circumstances.”).
Of all the Supreme Court Justices only Hugo Black held an absolutist view on
free speech. See Hugo L. Black & Edmond Cahn, Justice Black and First
Amendment “Absolutes”: A Public Interview, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 549, 553 (1962)
(“The beginning of the First Amendment is that ‘Congress shall make no law.’
I understand that it is rather old-fashioned and shows a slight naïveté to say
that ‘no law’ means no law. It is one of the most amazing things about the ingeniousness of the times that strong arguments are made, which almost convince me, that it is very foolish of me to think ‘no law’ means no law.”).
66. Espionage Act of June 15, 1917, Pub L. No. 65-24, ch. 30, § 3, 40 Stat.
217, 219 (amended 1997) (punishing the expression of sentiments that undermine war efforts).
67. 249 U.S. 47, 48 (1919).
68. 249 U.S. 204, 205 (1919).
69. 249 U.S. 211, 212 (1919).
70. Schenck, 249 U.S. at 49.
71. Id. at 49–50.
72. Id. at 52 (“The question in every case is whether the words used are
used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and
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was a high probability it would cause grave harm. Judges
were thereby empowered to balance concerns for selfexpression against those of public safety, leaving some room for
subjective adjudication. Ambiguity of what constituted a clearly
present danger required additional doctrinal development.
Just a week after deciding Schenck, the Court clarified that
a criminal conviction for speech could not be based solely on the
content of the message, but instead required the government to
prove up the intent of the speaker and the context of the utter74
ance. The trial court in Frohwerk issued arrest warrants for
75
printing and circulating articles opposing military service.
The Supreme Court held that the First Amendment did not
“give immunity for every possible use of language”; for instance, criminalizing incitement to murder is not unconstitu76
tional. Jacob Frohwerk’s intent to obstruct recruitment was
evident from his working jointly with others, even though he
77
lacked the means to carry out the scheme. The Court did not,
however, connect intent with the temporal proximity of likely
78
harm.
Frohwerk’s principle that restrictions on speech must be
judged on a case-by-case basis is consistent with civil procedure
79
rules of standing and ripeness, but today a court would certainly find that the First Amendment protects the expression of
80
antiwar sentiments. None of the extant history suggests that
present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress
has a right to prevent.”).
73. Hand’s model of the clear and present danger test requires courts to
“ask whether the gravity of the ‘evil,’ discounted by its improbability, justifies
such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger.” See, e.g.,
United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950).
74. Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 209 (1919) (explaining that a
statement’s potential “to kindle a flame” should be partly judged by the community where it is circulated); Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52 (“If the act, (speaking
or circulating a paper,) its tendency and the intent with which it is done are
the same, we perceive no ground for saying that success alone warrants making the act a crime.”).
75. Two Missouri Editors Held, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 1918, at 7.
76. Frohwerk, 249 U.S. at 206.
77. Id. at 209.
78. Id.
79. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 352 (2006) (“The doctrines of mootness, ripeness, and political question all originate in Article III’s
‘case’ or ‘controversy’ language, no less than standing does.”); Nat’l Park Hospitality Ass’n v. Dep’t of Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 808 (2003) (describing how the
doctrine of ripeness is aimed at avoiding premature judicial adjudication for
the court to avoid entangling itself in abstract disagreements).
80. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513–14
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Frohwerk was seeking to instigate a clear and present public
81
danger. He seemed instead to have been voicing his opinion
against the war. His resistance efforts were just as outrageous
to many Americans living during the Wilson administration as
the statement of funeral protestors in Snyder v. Phelps may
sound to modern sensibilities. Offensive speech, as we saw in
Part I, is constitutionally protected. For the present Article, the
82
questionable application of the Espionage Act of 1917 is of
lesser moment than the lasting impact the clear and present
danger test has had on First Amendment doctrine.
Frohwerk and Schenck determined that there are categories of anti-social communications that involve more than the
private interest to self-expression. In both of those cases, the
Court was convinced that the speakers’ intent to instigate resistance to conscription posed a clear danger. The flaw of these
judgments was in upholding the suppression and punishment
(1969) (holding that the First Amendment barred the suspension of students
who wore antiwar armbands to express their opposition to the Vietnam War
without causing any “substantial disruption of or material interference with
school activities”); see Eugene Volokh, Speech as Conduct: Generally Applicable Laws, Illegal Courses of Conduct, “Situation-Altering Utterances,” and the
Uncharted Zones, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1277, 1288 (2005) (“[U]nder modern
First Amendment law, courts would overturn convictions for antiwar leafleting or speeches, and would treat the law as content-based.”); James Weinstein,
Participatory Democracy as the Basis of American Free Speech Doctrine: A Reply, 97 VA. L. REV. 633, 666 (2011) (“[A]n antiwar protest in a public forum, is
afforded a much stronger presumption of protection than most other forms of
expression.”).
81. For contemporary accounts of Frohwerk’s journalism for the Missouri
Staats Zeitung and Kansas Staats Zeitung that led to his conviction, see German Americans Sought to Stop Allies’ Munitions, EVENING INDEP. (Massillon,
Ohio), Mar. 5, 1918, at 14; Threaten Boycott Against Ellinwood Democratic Editor Because He’s for Hughes but He Stands Firm and Scorns Democratic
Leaders Who Make Threats Against Him, HUTCHINSON NEWS (Hutchinson,
Kan.), Oct. 28, 1916, at 16.
82. In another case arising from criticism of the Wilson administration’s
handling of World War I, the Court upheld the conviction of the socialist leader Eugene Debs. Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919); Eugene Debs
Must Serve Prison Term, OGDEN EXAMINER (Ogden, Utah), Mar. 11, 1919, at
1; To Begin Sentence, HUTCHINSON NEWS (Hutchinson, Kan.), May 31, 1919,
at 1. The conviction was so questionable that after taking office, President
Warren Harding pardoned Debs. JOHN W. DEAN, WARREN G. HARDING 128
(2004) (discussing President Harding’s commutation of Debs’s sentence and
their meeting at the White House); Dan M. Kahan, Cognitively Illiberal State,
60 STAN. L. REV. 115, 131 n.62 (2007) (comparing Debs conviction to the
Court’s infamous holding on discrimination against homosexuals); Ken
Matheny & Marion Crain, Disloyal Workers and the “Un-American” Labor
Law, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1705, 1715 n.63 (2004) (stating that Debs did nothing
that would currently constitute espionage).

2013]

INFLAMMATORY SPEECH

1159

of political statements that were not menacing, violent, or dangerous. It would take years for the Court to provide guidance
that would prevent government from interfering with antiwar
sentiments while recognizing the public need to protect civic
tranquility against intentional threats.
B. THE MODERN TEST
In Brandenburg v. Ohio, the Court rejected the claim that
hateful statements made without the intent to intimidate the
83
public can be actionable. The per curiam opinion extended the
right of free expression to abstract statements voiced only in
84
the presence of like-minded individuals and invited guests.
The case arose from a rally to which only Klan members and
85
two guests were invited. The Court found the Ohio Criminal
86
Syndicalism Act to be unconstitutional because it punished
mere advocacy of unlawful actions, even in a circumstance
when a speaker did not threaten or incite others to commit
87
imminent criminality.
The key events in Brandenburg occurred at a Ku Klux
Klan rally to which Klansmen had invited a journalist and
88
cameraman. The closed nature of the event rendered it impos89
sible for speakers to scare or intimidate the public at large. As
a guest, the television crew was not intimidated by the proceedings because its presence was desired by the organizers; there90
fore, there was no true threat to anyone at the rally. The ap83. 395 U.S. 444, 447–49 (1969) (per curiam).
84. See id.
85. See id. at 445–46 (“The record shows that a man, identified at trial as
the appellant, telephoned an announcer-reporter on the staff of a Cincinnati
television station and invited him to come to a Ku Klux Klan ‘rally’ to be held
at a farm in Hamilton County. With the cooperation of the organizers, the reporter and a cameraman attended the meeting and filmed the events. Portions
of the films were later broadcast on the local station and on a national network. . . . No one was present other than the participants and the newsmen
who made the film.”).
86. The statute criminalized “‘advocat[ing] . . . the duty, necessity, or propriety of crime, sabotage, violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism as a
means of accomplishing industrial or political reform’ and for ‘voluntarily
assembl[ing] with any society, group, or assemblage of persons formed to teach
or advocate the doctrines of criminal syndicalism.’” Id. at 444–45 (quoting
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2923.13).
87. See id. at 449.
88. See supra note 85.
89. Other than Klansmen, only an invited reporter and cameraman attended. Brandenburg, U.S. 395 at 445.
90. A Klansman made a speech couched in hypothetical terms rather than
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pellate record provided no examples of direct threats being
made, only outrageously prejudicial statements about Jews and
91
blacks. While the facts of this case were quite different from
Snyder, the Court’s decision to protect speech in both was
based on the same principle: the First Amendment generally
protects statements not meant to place others in fear of their
safety.
The Supreme Court, therefore, overturned Brandenburg’s
conviction because the prosecution did not prove his speech was
92
likely to cause an imminent public disturbance. Nor was there
any proof that the Klansmen were conspiring to commit a
crime. Statements made at the rally were offensive but used
93
generalities rather than specific threats. The private context
in which the offensive statements were made indicated to the
Court that the speaker had not attempted to instigate immedi94
ate violence.
States and the federal government, on the other hand,
have an interest in criminalizing true threats that, unlike the
orders to immediate action: “The Klan . . . . [is] not a revengent [sic] organization, but if our President, our Congress, our Supreme Court, continues to suppress the white, Caucasian race, it’s possible that there might have to be some
revengeance [sic] taken.” Id. at 446. These derogatory statements, the Court
found, did not incite those who were present to commit imminently violent
acts. See id. at 448–49.
91. The tape of the event was electronically distorted and little could be
understood from it. The Court found that:
The significant portions that could be understood were: “How far is
the nigger going to-yeah.” “This is what we are going to do to the niggers.” “A dirty nigger.” “Send the Jews back to Israel.” “Let's give
them back to the dark garden.” “Save America.” “Let's go back to constitutional betterment.” “Bury the niggers.” “We intend to do our
part.” “Give us our state rights.” “Freedom for the whites.” “Nigger
will have to fight for every inch he gets from now on.”
Id. at 446 n.1. In another film of the rally someone asserted, “Personally, I believe the nigger should be returned to Africa, the Jew returned to Israel.” Id.
at 447.
92. See id. at 447–49.
93. See supra note 91 and accompanying text. The “true threat” standard,
which I discuss at the text accompanying footnotes 104–109, is laid out in Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
94. See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447–49. The “imminent threat of harm”
test, like its “clear and present danger” forerunner, was derived from John
Stuart Mill’s context-based example of criticism against corn dealers safely
delivered through the press, as opposed to a speech to a starving mob gathered
in front of the corn merchant’s house. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY
100–01 (London, John W. Parker and Son 2d ed. 1859). Ultimately, Mill was
more circumspect about legitimate speech than American legal standards. He
thought that the liberty of speech extended only so far as the speaker did “not
make himself a nuisance to other people.” Id. at 101.
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breast-beating statements at the Brandenburg rally, are meant
to intimidate the public rather than simply invigorate fanatics
95
or outrage opponents. The Supreme Court has expressly differentiated the true threat standard from the Brandenburg
imminent threat of harm test.
The seminal case on true threats, Watts v. United States,
involved the conviction of a defendant who told a crowd gathered to protest the Vietnam War draft at the Washington Monument, “If they ever make me carry a rifle the first man I want
96
to get in my sights is L.B.J.” The speaker was charged under
a federal statute, providing criminal penalties for willfully and
97
knowingly threatening the president. This was said at a far
more public forum than the private gathering in Brandenburg.
While a jury in Watts found the speaker had willfully threatened the president, there was no indication that he meant to
98
injure him. The Supreme Court found in favor of the speaker,
holding that he exhibited no actual intent to commit the
threatened harm but nevertheless upheld the statute on its
99
face.
Given that Watts overturned the conviction for threatening
the president but confirmed the constitutionality of a statute
that criminalized intentional intimidation, the Court spawned
obscurity about what constituted a true threat. The Second Circuit interpreted Watts to recognize only the constitutionality of
true threats statutes that punished instances of “unequivocal,
100
unconditional, immediate and specific” personal threats. The
Ninth Circuit, on the other hand, did not include the Brandenburg immediacy in its definition. A true threat according to the
95. See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707–08 (1969) (per curiam)
(deciding that a willful threat against the President of the United States is an
unprotected form of expression); In re Steven S., 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 644, 647 (Ct.
App. 1994) (holding that “malicious cross burning” on the private property of
another was a “true threat”).
96. Watts, 394 U.S. at 706.
97. In relevant part, the statute created a criminal cause of action against
anyone who “knowingly and willfully otherwise makes any such threat against
the President, President-elect, Vice President or other officer next in the order
of succession to the office of President, or Vice President-elect.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 871(a) (2006) (matching the language the Court quoted in Watts, 394 U.S. at
705).
98. Watts moved the court to acquit him because his statement was made
conditionally, in the event that he were to be drafted, during the course of political debate, and as a joke at which the crowd laughed. Watts, 394 U.S. at
706–07.
99. See id. at 708.
100. United States v. Kelner, 534 F.2d 1020, 1027 (2d Cir. 1976).
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latter circuit was decided by an “objective” test of “whether a
reasonable person would foresee that the statement would be
interpreted by those to whom the maker communicates the
statement as a serious expression of intent to harm or as101
sault.” The two circuits diverged in their points of reference
concerning the relevant standard, specifically about if a court
should focus on whether the speaker reasonably foresaw that
his words would affect the recipient of the statement or on
102
whether the recipient would reasonably sense a threat. From
both perspectives, assessment of the context of the statement,
the speaker’s intent, and whether the type of audience present
has a history of violence under similar circumstances are perti103
nent.
The Court resolved the circuit split when it applied the
true threats doctrine to a state cross burning statute in Virgin104
ia v. Black. Intent turned out to be a key component of the
doctrine, which recognizes that the criminalization of willful in105
timidation can be used to protect public safety. The Court rejected both the Second and Ninth Circuits’ glosses, defining
“true threats” to “encompass those statements where the
speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular indi106
vidual or group of individuals.” Nothing in that definition requires any immediate risk of violence. The prosecution also
need not prove that the speaker actually intended to carry out
107
the threat.
A trial court must evaluate whether the message contains
words, symbols, or depictions that, under the circumstances,
are meant to be intimidating. This requires a content rich
101. Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coal. of
Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1074 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v.
Orozco-Santillan, 903 F.2d 1262, 1265 (9th Cir. 1990)).
102. Doe v. Pulaski Cnty. Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616, 622 (8th Cir.
2002) (describing the difference between the Ninth and Second Circuits’ interpretations of the true threats doctrine).
103. Huntingdon Life Scis., Inc. v. Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty USA,
Inc., 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d 521, 539 (2005) (quoting United States v. Bell, 303 F.3d
1187, 1192 (9th Cir. 2002)).
104. 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
105. Cf. Dep’t of Revenue v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 342 (2008) (stating that
civic responsibilities include the protection of health, safety, and the advancement of citizens’ welfare).
106. Black, 538 U.S. at 359.
107. Id. at 359–60 (“The speaker need not actually intend to carry out the
threat.”).
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108

analysis. A majority of the justices in Black agreed with Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion which established that intentionally threatening communications, such as cross burnings
“carried out with the intent to intimidate,” are not protected by
109
the First Amendment. Justice Scalia’s concurrence in Black,
agreeing with the judgment that states can regulate cross
110
burning, appeared to be a significant shift from his earlier
conclusion in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, which had found con111
tent regulation of speech to be unconstitutional. While neither he nor the plurality in Black explicitly overturned R.A.V.,
by acknowledging that government could identify “burning a
112
cross is a particularly virulent form of intimidation,” Black
moved away from a categorical repudiation of content-based
regulations; a characterization that four justices who concurred
113
in R.A.V. had found to be a deeply flawed analysis.
108. See id. at 360–61.
109. Id. at 363. The majority distinguished the Brandenburg and Watts
tests, thereby establishing that they represent separate lines of First Amendment precedents. See id. at 359 (“[T]he constitutional guarantees of free
speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of
the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to
inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce
such action.” (quoting Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per
curiam))); id. (“And the First Amendment also permits a State to ban a ‘true
threat.’” (quoting Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (per
curiam))).
110. See id. at 368 (Scalia, J., concurring).
111. 505 U.S. 377, 395–96 (1992). In R.A.V. the Court struck down a St.
Paul, Minnesota ordinance that prohibited the public or private display of Nazi swastikas or burning crosses that were known to “arouse[] anger, alarm or
resentment on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender.” Id. (quoting
ST. PAUL, MINN., LEGIS. CODE § 292.02 (1990)). Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia found that the ordinance was a form of content discrimination that
violated the First Amendment. See id. at 391–96. Scalia recognized that the
City had a compelling interest in protecting the “members of groups that have
historically been subjected to discrimination.” Id. at 395. He nevertheless decided that such a legislative intent could only be constitutionally exercised by
a total ban on fighting words that “communicate ideas in a threatening manner,” rather than only specific manifestations of certain ideas like racial or religious bigotry. Id. at 393–94.
112. Black, 538 U.S. at 363 (“Instead of prohibiting all intimidating messages, Virginia may choose to regulate this subset of intimidating messages in
light of cross burning's long and pernicious history as a signal of impending
violence.”); see Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Home-Grown Racism: Colorado’s Historic Embrace—and Denial—of Equal Opportunity in Higher Education, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 703, 704, 724, 781 (1999) (discussing how the Ku
Klux Klan uses burning crosses to intimidate and organize).
113. Justice Byron White’s concurrence to R.A.V. drew attention to the majority’s misreading of doctrine. He found that Justice Scalia’s opinion protected
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Justice Scalia split from the Black plurality on the mens
rea element. Four Justices believed the prima facie element of
the Virginia statute was unconstitutional, finding that the
prosecution bears the burden of proving the defendant’s state of
mind to meet its initial burden of production beyond a reasona114
ble doubt. Justice Scalia, on the other hand, believed that the
state’s prima facie presumption of a culpable mind was constitutional because the law afforded offenders the right to rebut it
115
at trial.
The plurality of the Court further found that states can
prohibit the intimidating use of a hate symbols with a “perni116
cious history” without running afoul of the First Amendment.
Justice Thomas, in dissent, also noted the pernicious history of
117
the Klan’s use of the burning cross. He would have upheld
118
the validity of Virginia’s cross burning statute, which he understood to prohibit “intimidating conduct” unprotected by the
119
First Amendment. The plurality’s “brief history of the Ku
Klux Klan,” Justice Thomas wrote, and his own survey of the
organization’s past practices demonstrated that it “typically”
used burning crosses to terrorize, intimidate, and harass “racial
a class of communications that had been “long held to be undeserving of First
Amendment protection.” R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 401 (White, J., concurring). Justice White believed legislators had the latitude to limit only a subset of
fighting words constituting “the social evil of hate speech.” Id. He believed
hate speech to be a particularly dangerous form of social evil meant to “provoke violence or to inflict injury” rather than to exchange ideas. Id.
Justice Harry Blackmun added a concurrence to protest the majority’s
categorical statements. He saw no First Amendment values “compromised by
a law that prohibits hoodlums from driving minorities out of their homes by
burning crosses on their lawns.” Id. at 416 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Thus,
what the majority regarded as only emotive speech, Justice Blackmun regarded to be inflammatory.
In the third concurrence, Justice John Paul Stevens gave multiple examples of content regulations that the Supreme Court had earlier found to be
constitutional. See id. at 421 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens believed that the Court's opinion “disregard[ed] this vast body of case law” that
had “created a rough hierarchy in the constitutional protection of speech.”
Id. at 422.
114. Black, 538 U.S. at 364 (plurality opinion).
115. Id. at 369–70 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
116. See id. at 363 (plurality opinion).
117. See id. at 389 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[T]he majority’s brief history
of the Ku Klux Klan only reinforces th[e] common understanding of the Klan
as a terrorist organization, which, in its endeavor to intimidate, or even eliminate those it dislikes, uses the most brutal of methods.”).
118. See id. at 400 (“Because I would uphold the validity of this statute, I
respectfully dissent.”).
119. See id. at 388.
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minorities, Catholics, Jews, Communists, and any other groups
120
hated by the Klan.” Both the plurality’s and Justice Thomas’s
arguments require content rich analyses, to determine the potential cultural meanings of burning crosses. The plurality
analogized Virginia’s ability to single out symbols with menac121
ing messages to obscenity regulations. Thomas similarly asserted that cross burning was “the paradigmatic example” of
122
“profane,” unprotected speech. They could have also distinguished it from offensive or obnoxious expressions. As we saw
earlier, the Court rejected the obscenity comparison in Enter123
tainment Merchants and Stevens, thereby clearly distinguishing intentionally threatening words from the expression of outrageous content.
A more recent plurality decision, United States v. Alvarez,
drafted by Justice Anthony Kennedy, acknowledged the existence of several “historic and traditional categories” of speech—
including defamation and true threats—that states can regu124
late without violating the First Amendment. The plurality,
however, rejected a balancing test to determine whether a re125
straint on speech was constitutionally permissible.
In his
concurrence to the case, Justice Stephen Breyer (joined by Justice Elena Kagan) explicitly refused to follow Justice Kennedy’s
126
“strict categorical analysis.” Justice Breyer instead balanced
the “speech-related harm” against the “nature and importance
of the provision’s countervailing objectives, the extent to which
the provision will tend to achieve those objectives, and whether
127
there are other, less restrictive ways of doing so.” Part III
120. See id. at 389.
121. See id. at 363 (plurality opinion) (“[J]ust as a State may regulate only
that obscenity which is the most obscene due to its prurient content, so too
may a State choose to prohibit only those forms of intimidation that are most
likely to inspire fear of bodily harm.”).
122. See id. at 388 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
123. See supra text accompanying notes 60–63.
124. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544 (2012) (plurality opinion).
125. See id. (“In light of the substantial and expansive threats to free expression posed by content-based restrictions, this Court has rejected as startling and dangerous a free-floating test for First Amendment coverage . . .
[based on] an ad hoc balancing of relative social costs and benefits.” (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
126. Id. at 2551 (Breyer, J., concurring).
127. Id. Although in his concurrence Justice Breyer does not explicitly define this as balancing, referring to it instead as “fit between statutory ends
and means,” he recognizes the legitimacy of judicial analysis about whether
the purported risk posed by the regulated speech is so great that it counter-
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demonstrates that despite the Alvarez plurality’s assertion,
several precedents have in fact found certain categories of
speech, like true threats, to be unprotected because of their
harmful messages rather than their derivation from some undefined tradition.
III. PERMITTED REGULATIONS
The true threats doctrine is one of the few exceptions to the
content neutral requirement and imminent threat of harm
analysis. In this Part of the Article I examine several forms of
speech to which the Brandenburg imminence test does not and
should not apply, despite vehement academic sentiments to the
contrary. I begin by demonstrating the test’s insufficiency for
regulating intimidation posted on the Internet. I then examine
counterarguments about the constitutionality of regulations
prohibiting threatening displays of symbols that have historically been associated with violence. Next, I analyze whether
group defamation statutes, which First Amendment scholars
often claim to be invalid, offer a constitutionally legitimate avenue of redress against reputational harms. Finally, the Article
explains why criminalization of material support to designated
terrorist organizations is a constitutionally justifiable means of
preventing threats to the general welfare. In these cases, the
public concern for safety is rightly given greater weight than
the private interest in intimidation, defamation, and support
for groups engaged in political violence.
A. IMMINENT THREAT OF HARM ON THE INTERNET
The imminent threat of harm test is too narrow in scope to
regulate the dissemination of public threats streaming on the
Internet. The audience of the World Wide Web is so diffuse,
spread out throughout the world, that even intentional incite128
ment, which the Court found to be actionable in Black, is un129
likely to immediately instigate violence. It can, however, have
balances “the seriousness of the speech-related harm.” Id. (emphasis added);
see Gregory P. Magarian, Substantive Due Process as a Source of Constitutional Protection for Nonpolitical Speech, 90 MINN. L. REV. 247, 251–52 (2005)
(“[B]alancing methodology [is] manifest in the Supreme Court’s familiar
framework of tiered means-ends scrutiny, which allows many government restrictions on speech to survive First Amendment review.”).
128. See supra text accompanying notes 106–12.
129. For instance, United States v. Wilcox held that prosecutors did not
meet the Brandenburg test requirements because the defendant’s racist expressions on the Internet did not advocate violence or overthrow of the gov-
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long term negative ramifications. Statements dehumanizing
hated groups often influence the commission of discriminatory
130
conduct. E-mail exchanges can have serious long-term consequences. For example, Major Nidal Hasan engaged in an e-mail
131
discussion with Imam Anwar al-Awlaki of Yemen,
an alQaeda leader who was later killed in an American drone
132
strike. In one of his e-mails Hasan asked about the religious
legitimacy of “fighting Jihad” to help “Muslims/Islam” and dying as a “shaheed[],” but he gave no indication that he had any
133
immediate plans to carry out such an attack. Seeking advice
from Awlaki, who preached elsewhere that “all Americans were
valid targets,” was seemingly a calculated attempt to get sym134
pathetic advice; however, the e-mails between the two that
the Federal Bureau of Investigations has released are not ex135
plicitly conspiratorial. In another e-mail, Hasan wrote abernment such that they would be unprotected “dangerous speech” under the
particular circumstances. 66 M.J. 442, 449 (C.A.A.F. 2008).
130. ALEXANDER TSESIS, DESTRUCTIVE MESSAGES: HOW HATE SPEECH
PAVES THE WAY FOR HARMFUL SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 70–74 (2002) [hereinafter
TSESIS, DESTRUCTIVE MESSAGES] (discussing the long-term negative consequences of Internet hate speech).
131. “Lessons from Fort Hood: Improving Our Ability to Connect the Dots”:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight, Investigations, & Mgmt of the H.
Comm. on Homeland Sec., 112th Cong. 1–2 (2012) (statement of Douglas E.
Winter, Deputy Chair, The William H. Webster Commission on the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, Counterterrorism Intelligence, and the Events at
Fort Hood, Texas, on November 5, 2009), available at http://homeland.house
.gov/sites/homeland.house.gov/files/Testimony-Winter.pdf.
132. Zaid al-Alayaa, Yemen’s Leader Signs Agreement to Cede Power, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 24, 2011, at A10 (describing the CIA drone strike that killed alAwlaki, Yemen’s al-Qaeda recruiter).
133. See WILLIAM H. WEBSTER COMM’N ON THE FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, COUNTERTERRORISM INTELLIGENCE, AND THE EVENTS AT FORT HOOD,
TEX., ON NOV. 5, 2009, FINAL REPORT 41 (2012), available at http://www.fbi
.gov/news/pressrel/press-releases/final-report-of-the-william-h.-webster
-commission [hereinafter FORT HOOD FBI REPORT].
134. Al-Awlaki Tried to Use WMDs on Westerners, DAILY PAK BANKER
(Pak.), Oct. 2, 2011 (asserting that al-Awlaki “claimed all Americans were valid targets, and directed followers to engage in armed conflict with the United
States”).
135. Hasan subscribed to Al-Alwaki’s website and received generic “mass”
e-mails from Al-Alwaki which contained religious justifications for killing. See
FORT HOOD FBI REPORT, supra note 133, at 67–68. There were also personal
e-mails between Hasan and Al-Alwaki. See id. at 46 (“Hasan sent six messages
to Aulaqi . . . Aulaqi responded to Hasan twice.”). However, there was “no direct connection between the personal messages and the mass-mailed ones.” Id.
at 68. In these personal e-mails, Al-Alwaki indicated that he is unable to present a prize for Hasan’s proposed contest seeking essays on “Why is Anwar Al
Alwaki a great activist and leader” and thanked Hasan for his offer to help fi-
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stractly, with no stated immediate plan, that “I would assume
that suicide bomber whose aim is to kill enemy soldiers or their
136
helpers but also kill innocents in the process is acceptable.”
While the Brandenburg imminent threat of harm test protected
their communications, Hasan eventually translated al-Awlaki’s
ideology into the very action about which he had sought advice,
carrying out a fanatically driven terrorist spree, shooting to
137
death thirteen soldiers at Fort Hood, Texas. Awlaki later
bragged that Hasan was his student and defended the murder
138
spree as “a heroic act” and “a wonderful operation.”
E-mails are only one form of Internet communication that
speakers can adopt to incite violence. Web pages can stay up
indefinitely and affect an impressionable visitor’s behavior
shortly after the content is posted or years afterwards, a period
139
far exceeding immediacy.
Recent examples of Internet incitements that lacked any timeframe include defense of terror140
141
ism;
praise for pedophilia;
and support for murdering
nancially. See id. at 50–51. The combination of receiving personal e-mails may
have caused Hasan to believe that the mass-emails were meant specifically for
him.
136. Id. at 58.
137. FORT HOOD FBI REPORT, supra note 133, at 1.
138. Jacob Sullum, Commentary, With Terrorists, Obama’s ‘Trust Me’ Is
Not Enough, CHI. SUN TIMES, Oct. 5, 2011, at 34. In 2011, the United States
killed Awlaki in a drone strike. ‘Workplace Violence’ Update, WKLY. STANDARD, Dec. 19, 2011, at 4.
139. A 2002 case found that a website displaying the names and addresses
of abortion providers with black lines through those who had been killed, in
conjunction with “guilty” posters known to intimidate abortion physicians and
incite violence, was a true threat not protected by the First Amendment.
Planned Parenthood of The Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coal. of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1080, 1088 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc); see also Citron &
Norton, supra note 39, at 1460. Along a similar line of intimidation,
abortioncams.com is a website with images of women going into abortion clinics posted to intimidate and shame patients. Jonathan Zittrain, Privacy 2.0,
2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 65, 89 n.94.
140. For instance, Internet messages of al-Awlaki are readily available on
websites like YouTube, extolling the use of terror. Christopher Robbins, CIA
Drone Strike Misses Intended Target, Kills Other Al Qaeda Members,
GOTHAMIST (May 7, 2011, 11:52 AM), http://gothamist.com/2011/05/07/cia_
drone_strike_misses_intended_ta.php; see also Pippa Crerar, ‘I Don’t Feel Bitter but I’m not Ready to Forgive My Knife Attacker’, EVENING STANDARD (London), Nov. 4, 2010, available at http://www.standard.co.uk/news/stephen
-timms-i-dont-feel-bitter-but-im-not-ready-to-forgive-my-knife-attacker
-6532423.html (discussing how a Muslim student became radicalized through
al-Awlaki and then attempted to murder a British member of Parliament for
his support of the Iraq War). Another example of ongoing Internet exchanges
planning to commit terrorist acts involved Colleen LaRose, who had dubbed
herself “Jihad Jane” on the Internet. ‘Jihad Jane’ to Testify Here in Terror
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blacks, Jews, homosexuals, or members of other identifiable groups.
YouTube, an Internet source for international file sharing,
is a platform for seven hundred al-Awlaki videos, some of them
145
calling for violent jihad. YouTube also hosts videos of Imam
Abubakar Shekau, who is Imam of the Boko Haram Islamist
group that recently took responsibility for killing 143 people in
146
a terrorist attack in Kano, Nigeria. Shekau’s and al-Awlaki’s
videos typically do not call for specific or immediate violence
but speak of the perceived enemies of Islam in dehumanizing
terms and justify killing them whenever necessary. If the United States could obtain personal jurisdiction against those who
posted these videos and could prove the intent to instigate violence, the Black true threats doctrine would permit their prosecution.
YouTube is an example of a platform accessible to the pubTrial, SUNDAY INDEP. (Ireland), Feb. 6, 2011. LaRose carried on extensive email conversations that incited, supported, and planned the murder of Swedish cartoonist Lars Vilks for his depiction of Mohammed. Id. In 2007, the
House of Representatives expressed the sentiment that owners of websites
“should take action to remove jihadi propaganda.” H.R. Res. 224, 110th Cong.
(2007).
141. The most prominent group advocating pedophilia is North American
Man-Boy Love Association. See Who We Are, NAMBLA, http://www.nambla
.org/welcome.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2013).
142. Gary Rivlin, Discomfort over Google Site’s Hate Forums, INT’L HERALD
TRIB., Feb. 8, 2005, at 13 (describing Internet sites with a variety of hate content).
143. Kathryn Blaze Carlson, Muslim Group Backs Charges Against Extremists, NAT’L POST (Can.), July 10, 2010, at A5 (stating that following a fivemonth investigation charges had been brought against an individual who had
been posting calls for the mass murder of Jews).
144. Group Wants to Refute Against Anti-Obama Message, ARIZ. REPUBLIC,
Sept. 5, 2009, at 4 (mentioning sermons posted on the Internet advocating
death to homosexuals).
145. See Weiner Calls for Removal of More than 700 Terrorist Videos on
YouTube, FED. INFO. & NEWS DISPATCH, INC., Oct. 24, 2010, available at 2010
WLNR 21389375.
146. Attacks Carried Out in Nigeria, WASH. POST, Jan. 22, 2012, at A12
(describing the terrorist attack in Kano, the largest city in the Northern part
of Nigeria). For a representative set of videos with Imam Abubakar Shekau
preaching, see YOUTUBE.COM (search “Boko Haram, Imam Abubakar
Shekau”) (last visited Mar. 10, 2013). An English translation for one of the
videos is also available. See Aaron Y. Zelin, New Video Message from Boko Haram’s (Jama’at Ahl al-Sunnah li Da’wah wa-l-Jihad) Amir Imam Abu Bakr
Shekau: “We Are Coming to Get You Jonathan”, JIHADOLOGY.NET (Apr. 12,
2012), http://jihadology.net/2012/04/12/new-video-message-from-boko-harams
-jamaat-ahl-al-sunnah-li-dawah-wa-l-jihad-amir-imam-abu-bakr-shekau-we
-are-coming-to-get-you-jonathan/.
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lic at large and not just persons with passwords. It therefore
differs from the private rally scenario in Brandenburg. Spouting destructive messages on a publicly accessible website,
though it may not cause imminently dangerous outbursts, raises safety concerns that differ from those arising at a small, private rally. Even where there is no immediate incitement, the
context, audience, and speaker’s intent can indicate that there
is a true threat to a particular group. The intent of al-Awlaki
and Shekau was to incite the public at large; their messages
are so effective precisely because they pose short- and longterm threats.
Professor Cass Sunstein has pointed out the difficulty with
applying the Brandenburg standard to incitement on mass media communications because only a handful out of millions of
147
viewers might immediately commit violence. And even this
small segment of the audience might only be emboldened to act
days, weeks, or even years after long-term indoctrination. Yet
the intentional threats can pose a real danger to the targeted
group, shifting the matter into the public realm, requiring police action. Internet advocacy of future murder, maiming, and
other crimes creates risks beyond those recognized in Brandenburg and are much closer in line with the true threats doctrine
in Black. The question for the Court is whether the speaker
meant a threat to be outrageous or intimidating. Messages
purposefully posted at URLs are accessible by anyone, even users without knowledge of the individual, company, or organization that posted the message, and therefore different than the
privately attended rally from which Brandenburg arose. Those
who would have heard of the speech through the news report
would have received a filtered account rather than a message
intentionally directed by the source of intimidation. The World
Wide Web, as its name implies, is in large part, a public forum.
The imminent threat of harm standard, therefore, is inapplicable to most intentional threats made through the Internet. A
more effective method of regulating Internet incitement, at
least in cases where potential terrorism is involved, is to charge
any site operators who intentionally mean to intimidate third
persons. Purveyors of direct intimidation may be charged with
material support of terrorism, discussed in Part III.D of this
Article.
The true threats doctrine provides a framework for devel147. See Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutional Caution, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
361, 370.
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oping regulations capable of addressing some of the long-term
148
149
dangers posted on the Web. The Court’s guidance in Black
148. I’ve written extensively on the subject of long-term harms from hate
speech in TSESIS, DESTRUCTIVE MESSAGES, supra note 130; see also Alexander
Tsesis, Hate in Cyberspace: Regulating Hate Speech on the Internet, 38 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 817 (2001).
For a detailed discussion on the development of German antisemitism and
its influence on Nazi politics, see JOSEPH W. BENDERSKY, A CONCISE HISTORY
OF NAZI GERMANY 141 (3d ed. 2007) (describing Nazi exploitation of traditional European antisemitism); RICHARD J. EVANS, THE COMING OF THE THIRD
REICH 27 (2003) (describing the interrelatedness of historical and modern
antisemitism in Germany); SAUL FRIEDLANDER, NAZI GERMANY AND THE
JEWS: THE YEARS OF PERSECUTION, 1933–1939, at 3–4, 110, 324 (1997) (discussing the integration of European antisemitism in Nazi propaganda and its
indoctrinating effect in Germany and Austria).
The long-term effect of destructive messages is also evident from the Hutu
slaughter of Tutsis in Rwanda. See JEAN HATZFELD, MACHETE SEASON: THE
KILLERS IN RWANDA SPEAK 55 (Linda Coverdale trans., 2005) (describing radio broadcasts openly calling for Tutsi destruction prior to the 1994 genocide
in Rwanda); MAHMOOD MAMDANI, WHEN VICTIMS BECOME KILLERS: COLONIALISM, NATIVISM, AND THE GENOCIDE IN RWANDA 212 (2001) (quoting from the
Hutu-power Kangura newspaper, which dehumanized the Tutsis and called
for their destruction); JOSIAS SEMUJANGA, ORIGINS OF RWANDAN GENOCIDE
171–72 (2003) (providing an account of how racist ideology of the 1950s took
root in Hutu politics and permeated the popular view of Tutsis).
Likewise the Darfur genocide has been fueled by hate speech. Local authorities have periodically paid for the writing and performance of hate songs
to continue the instigation of the Janjaweed’s most recent onslaught against
Darfurians. Censored Singer Tries to Reform ‘Hate Singers,’ FREEMUSE (June
24, 2008), http://www.freemuse.org/sw28705.asp. According to an Amnesty International report, one song’s lyrics were:
The blood of the blacks runs like water
we take their goods
and we chase them from our area
and our cattle will be in their land.
The power of [Sudanese president Omer Hassan] al-Bashir
belongs to the Arabs
and we will kill you until the end, you blacks
we have killed your God.
Id. A woman’s song went:
You are gorillas
you are black
and you are badly dressed
Id. Such lyrics likely soothe the conscience of murderers, rapists, and torturers
as they pillage blacks, seeking control of Sudan. This material was originally
published in a Washington Post video news segment. Stephanie McCrummen,
Songs of Hope for Sudan, When Censors Allow, WASH. POST (June 19, 2008),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/story/2008/06/18/
ST2008061802936.html?sid=ST2008061802936.
Also on the African continent Kenyan hate radio programs helped instigate violence between the Kikuyu and Luo peoples. Kwamboka Oyaro, The

1172

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[97:1145

is particularly helpful because even the most open calls for terrorist violence may not seek to instigate immediate destruction.
There is a significant contrast between the true threats doctrine and the imminent threat of harm test. In this regard, the
fighting words doctrine, which the Court developed in
150
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, is also virtually irrelevant to
151
Internet communications. Fighting words statutes criminalize personal attacks that are likely to incite an average person
152
into “an immediate breach of the peace.” This doctrinal designation does not apply to intentionally threatening statements
that are unlikely to provoke an immediate scuffle; merely angering another is not enough. As we saw in Part I, the First
Amendment protects individuals who make outrageous statements, even when they severely upset observers’ feelings from
153
a distance, as was the case with Snyder.
The fighting words and incitement doctrines, then, are of
very limited relevance to the Internet. The Court created them
before communications capabilities of the World Wide Web
were even foreseeable. Threats on the Internet—whether they
are disseminated by a terrorist, supremacist group, or an individual ethnocentrist—are unlikely to immediately instigate a
Media Is Not Innocent, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Feb. 2, 2008, http://www
.ipsnews.net/africa/nota.asp? idnews=41049; Ofeibea Quist-Arcton, Tracing
the Roots of Ethnic Violence in Kenya, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Jan. 31, 2008), http://
www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=18582319. Police have found
leaflets inciting to violence, which Inspector General of Police David Kimaiyo
characterizes as intent on spreading “fear and panic,” being disseminated
ahead of the 2013 election. Kenya Election: Hatred Leaflets in Kisumu and
Mombasa, BBC (Feb. 22, 2013, 10:01 AM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world
-africa-21544847; Kimaiyo Claims on BBC that Hate Speech Leaflets Are
Spreading in the Country, KENYAN DAILY POST (Feb. 22, 2013, 5:59 AM),
http://www.kenyan-post.com/2013/02/kimaiyo-claims-on-bbc-that-hate
-speech.html; see also Drazen Jorgic, Kenya Tracks Facebook, Twitter for Election “Hate Speech”, REUTERS (Feb. 5, 2013, 12:46 PM), http://www.reuters
.com/article/2013/02/05/net-us-kenya-elections-socialmedia
-idUSBRE9140IS20130205.
And Turkish genocidal efforts against Armenians were also fueled by intentionally degrading threats. See DANIEL JONAH GOLDHAGEN, WORSE THAN
WAR: GENOCIDE, ELIMINATIONISM, AND THE ONGOING ASSAULT ON HUMANITY
209–10 (2009) (discussing how longstanding Turkish prejudice played a central role in the instigation of slaughter against Armenians).
149. See supra text accompanying notes 106–21.
150. 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1941).
151. I say “virtually irrelevant” because I can envision the unusual situation in which someone sends a combative text message to another in the same
room and instigates a fist fight.
152. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
153. See supra text accompanying notes 24–39.
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fight. The opportunity to attack the selected target might either
not be present or else be delayed for pragmatic reasons. Someone surfing the Web can encounter statements that might have
led to a fight had they been uttered during the course of a proximate confrontation, but when long distances separate the
speaker and intended target it is likely that any pugilistic feelings will dissipate, even if the two happen to meet at some distant point in the future.
B. TRUE THREATS
The applicability of the true threats doctrine to Internet
communication has been woefully understudied. Even scholars
who readily accept the doctrine’s constitutionality tend to avoid
it when discussing the Brandenburg imminent threat of harm
analysis. Astute First Amendment experts like Professors David Strauss, Robert Post, and Eugene Volokh usually neglect to
reflect on how the true threats doctrine qualifies the applicabil154
ity of Brandenburg.
In some cases there will be no overlap between incitement
and true threats doctrines. That is, in some circumstances they
will relate to distinct forms of unprotected speech. Incitement
155
requires intent to place another in imminent fear of harm,
while true threats require only intent to threaten a specific and
156
identifiable person or group. I am interested here in cases
where there is an overlap between the two; when an individual
154. Strauss typifies scholarly writing about the broad implications of the
Brandenburg standard without specifying that it refers to statements made in
private. See DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 54 (2010). In his
discussion of the case, he makes no mention of the most recent case about
cross burning, which found that a state cross burning statute with a mens rea
component can be constitutional even without an imminent threat of harm
component. See id. The same is true of Post’s recent chapter on hate speech
which, written six years after the Black decision, made no mention of how that
holding affected his central topic. Robert Post, Hate Speech, in EXTREME
SPEECH AND DEMOCRACY 123 (Ivan Hare & James Weinstein eds., 2009). So
too Volokh, who has questioned the constitutionality of hate speech regulation
but only once in the text of an article mentioned Black, and that in passing.
See Eugene Volokh, Crime-Facilitating Speech, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1095, 1135–
36 (2005). Other than that, Volokh has only made reference to the case in
string citations to three articles. See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and
Intellectual Property, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 697, 703 n.31 (2003); Eugene Volokh,
Parent-Child Speech and Child Custody Speech Restrictions, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV.
631, 670 n.171 (2006); Eugene Volokh, Private Employees’ Speech and Political
Activity: Statutory Protection Against Employer Retaliation, 16 TEX. REV. L. &
POL. 295, 314 n.84 (2012).
155. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447–49 (1969) (per curiam).
156. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003) (plurality opinion).
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who threatens another is also trying to incite third parties to
inflict harm on the victim. In the latter case, courts are faced
with a circumstance where imminence is unnecessary to hold
the speaker accountable for a true threat that is also likely to
incite harmful behavior. Black involved a symbol, the burning
157
cross, that can be adopted to intentionally threaten another
and to incite others to commit hate crimes. In some situations,
such as those that gave rise to the litigation in Black, there can
be overlap between an incitement and a threatening symbol—
be it a cross, swastika, Hezbollah flag, al-Qaeda symbol, or
some other statutorily defined hate symbol. Black was about an
instance when there was an intent to threaten others through
the use of symbolic speech that incited people to violence based
158
on group defamations. But the true threats doctrine can be
read more broadly than this. Although Black dealt only with intimidating symbolism, nothing in the opinion supports Professor Rebecca Tushnet’s recent claim that the Court treats imag159
es as more threatening than words. The key take away point
from the case is that laws prohibiting intentional threats, be
they oral or symbolic communications, are not protected by the
First Amendment even when they limit the content of speakers
messages.
Some challenge the plurality’s premise in Black. Professor
Steven Gey takes issue with Black for what he calls “the
Court’s disturbing concession that governments may mete out
overtly content-based sanctions on speech,” that is classified in
160
the “unprotected category of ‘true threats.’” He is concerned
that the true threats doctrine erodes some of the values in
161
Brandenburg. Gey so strongly disagrees with content-based
regulations on threats that to better make his point he dubs
O’Connor’s plurality opinion in Black as “confused and confus162
ing.” This claim, however, seems to be merely vitriolic. Even
157. See id. at 347.
158. See id. at 363.
159. Rebecca Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words: The Images of Copyright,
125 HARV. L. REV. 683, 697–98 (2012) (stating that the “burning cross—a
symbol—was understood to constitute essentially an explicit threat, allowing
the state to ban cross-burning carried out for the purposes of intimidation.
Words, however vicious, would have had difficulty carrying the same threatening power as the flaming cross”).
160. Gey, Questions About Cross Burning, supra note 10, at 1324.
161. Id.
162. Steven G. Gey, The Brandenburg Paradigm and Other First Amendments, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 971, 1006 (2010) [hereinafter Gey, The Brandenburg Paradigm].
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the dissent in Black believed the state can regulate cross burning without violating the First Amendment but thought that
the Virginia statute was overbroad because it punished more
than just “particularly virulent” forms of proscribable commu163
nications.
Gey is especially disturbed by the Black plurality’s opinion
because he believes it departs from the iconic Brandenburg
standard by embracing Virginia’s prohibition against a disfa164
vored group’s political message. This claim is, however, unjustified because in her opinion O’Connor does not focus on the
Klan as a politically disfavored group but rather its use of sym165
bols to threaten the public.
While Gey calls her opinion
166
“schizophrenic,” the opinion established and applied a consistent scienter standard. Indeed, O’Connor overturned one of
the convictions the Court considered in the two consolidated
cases composing Black, remanding that matter to the state be167
cause the prosecution failed to prove the intent to intimidate.
Black is as consistent as the general protection on labor picketing that does not hold true when it involves “intimidation, and
168
reprisal or threats thereof.” In both circumstances, the right
to free speech is held to be sacrosanct, but not when it involves
the use of intentional threats. Intimidating uses of symbols
that are linked to violence, such as burning crosses, are very
different from the picketing in Snyder or the outrageous speech
169
in Entertainment Merchants and Stevens.
Unlike Gey, I do not believe the Court’s reasoning in Black
to be inconsistent with Brandenburg’s; instead, it clarified the
reach of the earlier opinion. Rather than adopting the Bran163. Black, 538 U.S. at 382 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part).
164. Gey, The Brandenburg Paradigm, supra note 162, at 1007.
165. Black, 538 U.S. at 352–57 (plurality opinion) (expostulating on the
Klan’s long history of violence).
166. Gey, The Brandenburg Paradigm, supra note 162, at 1007.
167. Gey misstates that the reason why the Court overturned Black’s conviction was that it found his burning a cross to be “entirely political.” Id. at
1007–08. But that was not the rational of Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion.
She explained, instead, that the conviction had to be overturned because the
trial judge had wrongly instructed the jury to presume Black’s intent rather
than deliberate on whether the prosecution had proven that state of mind beyond a reasonable doubt. Black, 538 U.S. at 349–50, 367.
168. NLRB v. Drivers Local Union 639, 362 U.S. 274, 290 (1960) (interpreting the National Labor Relations Act as it was amended by the Taft-Hartley
Act).
169. See discussion of cases supra Part I.
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denburg imminence standard, Black defined true threats to be
“those statements where the speaker means to communicate a
serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful vi170
olence to a particular individual or group of individuals.” The
prohibition against true threats prevents speakers from disturbing the public peace by intentionally placing others in fear
171
of danger. Both cases involved defendants who had burned
crosses, but there were material differences between them. In
Brandenburg, police officers arrested a Klan member for burning a cross at a private gathering that was only attended by in172
vitees. Black, on the other hand, involved the arrest of individuals who had burned crosses in plain sight of third
173
parties. Only in Black, therefore, was the Court faced with a
situation in which intimidation was aimed at persons uninvolved in the Klan ritual. For an intimidation statute to survive
constitutional challenge, then, it must include public statement
and intent components. The intimidation in Black was overt,
while in Brandenburg the burning cross was a symbol of group
unity.
Not only is Professor Gey critical of the holding in Black,
he denies its gloss on Brandenburg’s imminent threat of harm
170. Black, 538 U.S. at 359.
171. Id. at 360 (“Rather, a prohibition on true threats ‘protect[s] individuals from the fear of violence’ and ‘from the disruption that fear engenders,’ in
addition to protecting people ‘from the possibility that the threatened violence
will occur.’” (quoting R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992))).
172. The defendant in Brandenburg called a reporter of a Cincinnati television station to come to a Klan rally. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 445
(1969) (per curiam). The reporter arrived to the event with a cameraman who
filmed the proceedings. Id.
173. Black involved convictions for violating the Virginia cross burning
statute, prohibiting anyone from burning a cross to intentionally intimidate a
person or group of persons. Black, 538 U.S. at 348. The prosecution had secured one of the felony convictions against a defendant who burned a cross on
private property but in a location that was visible from a public road. Cars observed the cross burning and a few of the travelers asked a sheriff about it. Id.
A white woman who witnessed the rally from her property, adjacent to the rally felt “very . . . scared” when she heard speakers discussing shooting blacks.
Id.; Black v. Virginia, 553 S.E.2d 738, 749 (Va. 2001) (noting that the witness,
Rebecca Sechrist “stated: ‘I was scared our home would get burned or something would happen to it. We’ve got two . . . kids and I was afraid that something would happen to them.’ In response to a question by defendant’s counsel,
Sechrist testified: ‘I think they were trying to scare me.’”). The Supreme Court
of Virginia consolidated this case with an unrelated matter regarding three
individuals who tried to burn a cross in the yard of a black man to vindicate a
personal vendetta. Black, 538 U.S. at 350–51. The victim felt “very nervous”
when he came across the burned cross by his house, not knowing whether this
was only the first step of an escalating situation. Id. at 350.
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test. He writes that, even after Black, political advocacy continues to be protected unless it poses an immediate threat of a
concrete harm “and the speaker intends his or her speech to in174
stigate the immediate harm.” This is a common mistake. Professor Daniel Farber likewise elides the true threats doctrine
175
with the imminent threat of harm criterion.
But Justice
O’Connor’s opinion said nothing of the kind. In fact, one of the
prosecution’s key witnesses saw the burning cross from afar, on
her in-laws’ lawn, and others noticed it while driving on an ad176
jacent road. This spectacle by no means caused an imminent
threat of harm, but liability could nevertheless attach if it was
intentionally meant to threaten observers. A majority of the
177
Court, with Justice Scalia joining in concurrence and Justice
Thomas in agreement about this aspect despite dissenting on
178
other grounds, regarded intimidation to be enough for conviction irrespective of whether witnesses sensed any imminent
threat of harm.
While Black involved only one type of intimidating symbol,
the decision’s underlying finding can readily be extended to
other symbols—like the swastika, Hamas flag, Sri Lankan
Tamil Tiger Emblem, and such—used by organizations adher179
ing to violent ideologies and justifying terrorism. Context is
174. Gey, Questions About Cross Burning, supra note 10, at 1294 (stating
that one of the central First Amendment issues “involves the bedrock principle
that political advocacy is protected from government regulation unless the advocacy takes the form of incitement, the advocacy occurs in a context where an
immediate concrete harm follows from the speech in question, and the speaker
intends his or her speech to instigate the immediate harm”).
175. Farber, supra note 10, at 925 (“Although Virginia v. Black represents
the Court’s official recognition of true threats as unprotected and its first definition of the category’s boundaries, it can hardly be viewed as a surprise that
the government is entitled to prevent individuals from threatening an individual or the public with immediate violence.”).
176. Black, 538 U.S. at 348.
177. Justice Scalia concurred because he, unlike the plurality, believed
that the Virginia statute’s prima facie presumption of intentional intimidation
was constitutional. Id. at 368–71 (Scalia, J., concurring).
178. Justice Thomas argued in the dissent to Black that cross burning was
intrinsically intimidating, which contradicted the plurality’s view that some
forms of cross burning could be expressive and implicate First Amendment
coverage. Id. at 388–400 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
179. Cf. Alexander Tsesis, Burning Crosses on Campus: University Hate
Speech Codes, 43 CONN. L. REV. 617, 666 n.295 (2010) (“The Hamas flag is just
as ideologically violent as the swastika.”); Alexander Tsesis, Dignity and
Speech: The Regulation of Hate Speech in a Democracy, 44 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 497, 503–04 (2009) (“Destructive messages are particularly dangerous
when they rely on historically established symbolism, such as burning crosses
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important here because it reveals whether the message is only
meant to trigger angst and outrage, in which case it would not
be actionable, or intended to be a true threat.
C. GROUP DEFAMATION
Black is among those cases in which the Court determined
that public interest trumped the right to express inciting
180
statements. This deliberation about social harm arising from
expressive conduct belies Alvarez’s claim that balancing other
181
social interests against speech is impermissible. Another set
of cases, dealing with group defamations, permit state limits on
speech threatening public order and specifically designed to
182
protect individuals and groups against reputational harms.
Like the true threats cases, defamation laws do not adhere to
categorical notions of the First Amendment. Both are concerned with statements made for public consumption, while
Brandenburg was about statements communicated during a
meeting of like-minded individuals and their guests who were
not intending to intimidate anyone at the gathering. The group
defamation doctrine and true threats doctrines are not, however, identical. Group defamation statutes punish the written and
oral communications of discriminatory stereotypes that are
183
likely to instigate public disturbances,
while true threats
statutes punish intentional intimidation.
or swastikas, in order to kindle widely shared prejudices.”); Alexander Tsesis,
The Problem of Confederate Symbols: A Thirteenth Amendment Approach, 75
TEMP. L. REV. 539, 543 (2002) (discussing the cultural significance of Confederate symbols placed on state property); Richard L. Wiener & Erin Richter,
Symbolic Hate: Intention to Intimidate, Political Ideology, and Group Association, 32 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 463, 475 (2008) (discussing an empirical study
that found that participants thought the display of symbols like swastikas,
burning crosses, and skin fists to be intimidating); Timothy Zick, Cross Burning, Cockfighting, and Symbolic Meaning: Toward a First Amendment Ethnography, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2261, 2291 (2004) (“There can be little
doubt that the swastika is as intimidating to some as the burning cross.”).
180. Helen Norton has recently explained that government hate speech
may also violate Equal Protection principles. See Helen Norton, The Equal
Protection Implications of Government’s Hateful Speech, 54 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 159, 163 (2012).
181. See supra text accompanying notes 124–27.
182. See Waldron, supra note 21, at 1605–09.
183. In Beauharnais, the Court found that an Illinois group defamation
statute did not violate the First Amendment because it was drafted not as “a
catchall” but specifically directed “at a defined evil” to punish the use of racist
and antisemitic epithets that were “productive of breach of the peace or riots.”
Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 251, 253 (1952).
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In Beauharnais v. Illinois, the Court upheld a state statute
criminalizing group libel that “portrays depravity, criminality . . . or lack of virtue of a class of citizens, of any race, color,
creed or religion” and exposes those citizens to “contempt, deri184
sion, or obloquy.” Consistent with the holding in Beauharnais, group defamations can further be extended to revilement
based on ethnicity, nationality, alienage, gender, or sexual orientation.
In a seminal decision, the Supreme Court limited the types
of expressions that qualify to those that offend “our basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human being—
185
a concept at the root of any decent system of ordered liberty.”
Judicial review of group defamation statutes, then, must consider the specific statement’s potential to disrupt the public
peace and the public policy’s connection to essential concepts of
dignity and human worth. Proving group defamation, like its
common law tort counterpart, does not require a showing of
clear and present danger because the speech involved is not
186
constitutionally protected.
The Beauharnais decision has been roundly criticized by a
variety of First Amendment scholars. Several of its detractors
believe Beauharnais is no longer good law. Professor Jonathan
D. Varat, for one, thinks that “[t]here is good reason to believe
that today the First Amendment would bar an action for group
187
libel, as distinct from individual libel.” Varat explains that
the danger with punishing libel is that suppression of “lies”

184. Id. at 251 (quoting 38 ILL. REV. STAT. § 471 (1949)).
185. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974) (quoting Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted)). That standard of dignity resembles the approach that
other countries extend beyond injuries to private reputation. For instance,
Germany prohibits the distribution of “written materials . . . which describe
cruel or otherwise inhuman acts of violence against humans . . . in a manner
expressing glorification or which downplays such acts of violence or which represents the cruel or inhuman aspects of the event in a manner which violates
human dignity.” STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] [PENAL CODE], Dec. 2007, § 131(1)
(Ger.), translated in THE GERMAN CRIMINAL CODE: A MODERN ENGLISH
TRANSLATION 116 (Michael Bohlander trans., 2008).
186. See Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 266 (“Libelous utterances not being
within the area of constitutionally protected speech, it is unnecessary, either
for us or for the State courts, to consider the issues behind the phrase ‘clear
and present danger.’”).
187. Jonathan D. Varat, Deception and the First Amendment: A Central,
Complex, and Somewhat Curious Relationship, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1107, 1116
(2006).
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runs the risk of silencing despised speakers. He is concerned
that group defamation prosecutions will infringe on selfexpression.
Varat’s arguments against group defamation seem plausible at first glance because protection of unpopular speakers is
at the core of free speech doctrine. His point is, nevertheless,
misguided because it ignores that society has determined that
the dignitary harms suffered by defamed parties distinguish
189
group stereotypes from innocuous lies, such as false claims
190
about military honors. Earlier in this paper, I pointed out
that the Court has determined that protecting the public from
the dangers of menacing racist symbols outweighs a speaker’s
191
interest in threateningly displaying them. The Court has upheld some other laws limiting speech because they are likely to
mislead listeners. The element of deception is also intrinsic to
192
the regulation of false advertisements and trademark viola193
tions. Here, as in cases of group defamation, the public’s interest in receiving accurate information receives greater judicial consideration than the private right to make false
194
statements.
188. Id. at 1116–17.
189. I am drawing an analogy from Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s “concern for dignitary harms,” which, as Professor Karst has pointed out in a different context, “bears a strong family resemblance to the concerns of modern
equal protection doctrine as applied to discrimination against ‘outsiders’ in
other categories of self-identity, such as race or sex or sexual orientation.”
Kenneth L. Karst, Justice O’Connor and the Substance of Equal Citizenship,
2003 SUP. CT. REV. 357, 368.
190. See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2551 (2012) (plurality
opinion) (holding the Stolen Valor Act to be unconstitutional for criminalizing
falsely claiming to have received military honors); see also Lyrissa Barnett
Lidsky, Where's the Harm?: Free Speech and the Regulation of Lies, 65 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 1091, 1091 n.2 (2008) (“The State may only punish deliberate
falsehoods when they cause significant harms to individuals.”).
191. See supra text accompanying notes 105–14.
192. See, e.g., Persaud Cos. v. IBCS Grp., Inc., 425 F. App’x 223, 227 (4th
Cir. 2011) (finding that a marketing brochure satisfied “the statutory requirements of a false advertisement” because “it [was]—at a minimum—
misleading or deceptive”); Telebrands Corp. v. F.T.C., 457 F.3d 354, 356 n.4
(4th Cir. 2006) (discussing the Federal Trade Commission Act’s provision
against deceptive acts that affect interstate commerce).
193. See, e.g., Buetow v. A.L.S. Enter., Inc., 650 F.3d 1178, 1182 (8th Cir.
2011) (stating that “deception is material” to a false advertising claim under
the Lanham Act (Trademark Act of 1946)).
194. See FTC v. Winsted Hosiery Co., 258 U.S. 483, 494 (1922) (stating that
there is no protection on “trade-marks which deceive the public” even if “members of the trade are not misled”); Phoenix of Broward, Inc. v. McDonald’s
Corp., 489 F.3d 1156, 1172 (11th Cir. 2007) (recognizing that the public has a
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Varat’s definition of group defamation—as only dealing
195
with deceptive statements —is, moreover, too narrow. Group
defamation is further concerned with maintaining public order
196
and protecting vulnerable individuals from targeted harm. At
bottom, defamatory statements directed at a particular group,
especially when they incorporate historical prejudices and biases, can be regulated because they result in reputational harms,
197
not merely because they are hyperbolic or misleading.
A different line of academic attack against Beauharnais
presumes it has been superseded by subsequent decisions.
Dean Erwin Chemerinsky takes this approach. He speculates
that “Beauharnais almost certainly would be declared unconsti198
tutional today based on vagueness and overbreadth grounds.”
Professor Rodney Smolla more unequivocally asserts that,
“Beauharnais is flatly inconsistent with modern First Amendment doctrines restraining content-based and view-point based
199
discrimination.” Professor Nadine Strossen, former president
of the American Civil Liberties Union, similarly states that
“[t]he group defamation concept . . . has been thoroughly dis200
credited.”
Strossen’s perspective is informed by Professor
right to be protected against false advertisement); Ford v. NYLCare Health
Plans of Gulf Coast, Inc., 301 F.3d 329, 339 (5th Cir. 2002) (Benavides, J., concurring) (same); Kohler Co. v. Moen Inc., 12 F.3d 632, 637 (7th Cir. 1993)
(“[T]rademark protection . . . precludes competitors only from using marks
that are likely to confuse or deceive the public.”).
195. See Varat, supra note 187, at 116–19 (discussing whether Holocaust
deniers have First Amendment protection).
196. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 251 (1952).
197. In his concurrence to Rosenblatt v. Baer, Justice Potter Stewart explained interests protected by defamation laws:
The right of a man to the protection of his own reputation from unjustified invasion and wrongful hurt reflects no more than our basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human being—a concept at the root of any decent system of ordered liberty. The protection
of private personality, like the protection of life itself, is left primarily
to the individual States under the Ninth and Tenth Amendments. But
this does not mean that the right is entitled to any less recognition by
this Court as a basic of our constitutional system.
Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring).
198. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 64, at 978. Professor Ronald K. L. Collins is
also reticent, writing that today group libel laws “are deemed constitutionally
suspect.” Ronald K. L. Collins, Free Speech, Food Libel, & the First Amendment. . . in Ohio, 26 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1, 28 (2000).
199. Rodney A. Smolla, Words “Which by Their Very Utterance Inflict Injury”: The Evolving Treatment of Inherently Dangerous Speech in Free Speech
Law and Theory, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 317, 351 (2009).
200. Nadine Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: A Modest Proposal?, 1990 DUKE L.J. 484, 517.
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Laurence H. Tribe’s more qualified observation that:
201

New York Times v. Sullivan seemed to some to eclipse Beauharnais’
sensitivity to . . . group defamation claims . . . because New York
Times [v. Sullivan] required public officials bringing libel suits to
prove that a defamatory statement was directed at the official per202
sonally, and not simply at a unit of government.

Popular as these claims are, they do not hold up to precedential
scrutiny. These statements are contrary to several major Supreme Court opinions that cite to Beauharnais for its preceden203
tial value.
Academics who presume Sullivan obliterated the holding
in Beauharnais often follow a Seventh Circuit mistake in Amer204
ican Booksellers Ass’n v. Hudnut.
In Sullivan, the Court
ruled that for a public figure to prevail in a suit for defamation,
she must prove that the offensive statement in question was
205
made with actual malice. One of Hudnut’s defenders mistakenly stated that the “doctrinal tides that have swept libel in
general into the First Amendment ocean” in the wake of Sulli206
van “have left Beauharnais . . . high and dry.” That statement closely tracks the Hudnut opinion’s erroneous dictum
that “cases such as New York Times v. Sullivan,” which set a
high burden of proof for public officials seeking redress for defamation, “[have] so washed away the foundations of Beauhar201. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
202. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-17, at
926–27 (2d ed. 1988).
203. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2561 (2012) (Alito,
J., dissenting) (stating that “many kinds of false factual statements have long
been proscribed without raising any Constitutional problem.” (internal quotations omitted)); United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1584 (2010) (citing
to Beauharnais as an example of one of the few exceptions to the general prohibitions against content based regulations on speech); R.A.V. v. City of St.
Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382–83 (1992) (drawing attention to cases like Beauharnais, dealing with “traditional limitations” that do not offend First Amendment protections on free speech); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub.
Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 592 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(stating that group libel falls outside the First Amendment “despite this
Court’s references to a marketplace of ideas”).
204. 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985).
205. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279–80 (“The constitutional guarantees require . . . a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages
for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that
the statement was made with ‘actual malice’ . . . .”).
206. Eric M. Freedman, A Lot More Comes into Focus When You Remove
the Lens Cap: Why Proliferating New Communications Technologies Make It
Particularly Urgent for the Supreme Court to Abandon Its Inside-Out Approach to Freedom of Speech and Bring Obscenity, Fighting Words, and Group
Libel Within the First Amendment, 81 IOWA L. REV. 883, 950 (1996).
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nais that it [can no longer] be considered authoritative.” Just
as forcefully but misleadingly, Judge Richard Posner in another
Seventh Circuit decision wrote, even “though Beauharnais v.
Illinois has never been overruled, no one thinks the First
Amendment would today be interpreted to allow group defama208
tion to be prohibited.” This presumption has never been supported by the Supreme Court; to the contrary, the justices have
shown every sign that the diametrically opposite is true.
To begin, the Court has repeatedly and approvingly cited to
Beauharnais as controlling precedent on the constitutionality of
defamation law. As recently as 2010, in a case discussed in Part
I of this Article, the Supreme Court determined that Beauharnais is one of several lines of cases that permit restrictions on
209
the content of speech without violating the First Amendment.
Furthermore, in 2012 three Justices in dissent reiterated that
210
Beauharnais continues to be binding authority. In an earlier
case, the Supreme Court cited Beauharnais to demonstrate the
proposition that libel is among the “categories of communication and certain special utterances to which the majestic pro211
tection of the First Amendment does not extend.”
Furthermore, at least two Supreme Court justices raised
concerns with the Seventh Circuit’s presumptuousness that
Beauharnais has been overruled. Justice Harry A. Blackmun,
joined by Justice Byron R. White, wrote an unusual dissent to a
212
denial of certiorari in Smith v. Collin. Petitioners had sought
a writ of certiorari from the Court of Appeals holding unconstitutional an ordinance prohibiting the dissemination of ha213
tred. “[T]he Seventh Circuit’s decision is in some tension with
Beauharnais,” Blackmun asserted; “[t]hat case has not been
214
overruled or formally limited in any way.” Subsequent Supreme Court majority opinions have borne out the legitimacy of
207. Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 331 n.3.
208. Nuxoll ex rel. Nuxoll v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. No. 204, 523 F.3d
668, 672 (7th Cir. 2008).
209. United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1584 (2010). Even R.A.V. v.
City of St. Paul, a case that is often cited by the opponents of inflammatory
speech regulation, referred to Beauharnais as an example of a legitimate government regulation against speech based on content. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,
505 U.S. 377, 382–83 (1992).
210. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2561 (2012) (Alito, J., dissenting) (joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas).
211. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 504 (1984).
212. Smith v. Collin, 439 U.S. 916, 919 (1978) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
213. Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978).
214. Smith, 439 U.S. at 919 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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group defamation limitations on incitement.
The Seventh Circuit’s underlying error was to misconstrue
Sullivan as an abandonment of Beauharnais rather than a
qualification of it. Sullivan, which we saw earlier, set a high
burden of proof for public officials suing for defamation, only
impacted the holding of Beauharnais as it applies to public figures. Based on the many Supreme Court cases that continue to
216
cite Beauharnais in the context of simple defamation, Sullivan’s actual malice standard does not apply to private group
defamation cases. The Supreme Court recognized this distinction between the two in New York v. Ferber, asserting that
Beauharnais remains the controlling precedent on the publication of group libel except in cases “when public officials are the
217
target[s].” Even post-Sullivan, therefore, a state can criminalize portrayals that tend to subject “a class of citizens, of any
race, color, creed, or religion” to “contempt, derision, or oblo218
quy.” In such circumstances, private plaintiffs must prove
that defendants negligently made a false statement that caused
219
harm to the reputation or standing of a protected group. But
in cases of public group defamation, Sullivan qualifies Beauharnais to require proof of actual malice.
Despite the Supreme Court’s regular reliance on Beauhar215. United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1584 (2010) (“From 1791 to
the present . . . the First Amendment has permitted restrictions upon the content of speech in a few limited areas, and has never include[d] a freedom to
disregard these traditional limitations. These historic and traditional categories . . . includ[e] obscenity [and] defamation . . . .” (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted)); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383 (1992)
(“We have recognized that ‘the freedom of speech’ referred to by the First
Amendment does not include a freedom to disregard these traditional limitations.”); Bose Corp., 466 U.S. at 504 (“[T]here are categories of communication
and certain special utterances to which the majestic protection of the First
Amendment does not extend . . . . Libelous speech has been held to constitute
one such category.”).
216. See supra notes 209–11 and accompanying text.
217. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763 (1982) (citing Sullivan and
Beauharnais for the proposition that, “[l]eaving aside the special considerations when public officials are the target, a libelous publication is not protected by the Constitution”).
218. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 270–71 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting) (quoting an Illinois group defamation statute).
219. See Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 347–48 (1974) (stating that states
cannot impose strict liability). The Court stressed in Gertz that injuries in defamation cases typically involved the “impairment of reputation and standing
in the community, personal humiliation, and mental anguish and suffering.”
Id. at 350. Defamation can lead monetary loss, but it is not a prerequisite for
standing. Id.
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nais for its precedential value, Professor Calvin R. Masey asserts that “the group libel concept has been thoroughly discred220
ited.” Masey bases this claim on the four dissents to the case,
even though the justices who wrote them did not convince the
221
majority. Be that as it may, three of four dissents did not
dismiss group defamation out of hand as a categorical in222
fringement on speech. Only one of the dissenting Justices,
Hugo Black, entirely rejected the constitutionality of group def223
amation statutes.
The other three dissenters conceded that group defamation
could be actionable under certain circumstances, but disagreed
224
with the majority’s judgment of the case. In his dissent, Justice William O. Douglas acknowledged that the Nazi success of
manipulating the population through antisemitic propaganda
demonstrated that group defamation, particularly when it is intentional, has the potential of causing widespread harms:
Hitler and his Nazis showed how evil a conspiracy could be which was
aimed at destroying a race by exposing it to contempt, derision, and
obloquy. I would be willing to concede that such conduct directed at a
225
race or group in this country could be made an indictable offense.

In another dissenting opinion to Beauharnais, Justice Robert
Jackson recognized that the government had authority to enact
a group libel statute but did not join the majority because he
believed that Beauharnais did not receive an adequate oppor226
tunity to proffer his defense at trial. Finally, Justice Stanley
Reed asserted that group defamation statutes could only be
constitutional if they included a culpability element to prove

220. Calvin R. Massey, Hate Speech, Cultural Diversity, and the Foundational Paradigms of Free Expression, 40 UCLA L. REV. 103, 142 n.164 (1992).
221. Id.
222. See Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 283 (Reed, J., dissenting) (assuming a
state may “pass group libel laws to protect the public peace”); id. at 284 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (arguing that Nazi propaganda in Hitler Germany “could be
made an indictable offense”); id. at 299 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (agreeing with
the majority that a state can protect minorities under its libel laws).
223. Id. at 274–75 (Black, J., dissenting).
224. Id. at 279 (Reed, J., dissenting) (“It is when speech becomes an incitement to crime that the right freely to exhort may be abridged.”); id. at 284–
85 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“My view is that if in any case other public interests are to override the plain command of the First Amendment, the peril of
speech must be clear and present . . . .”); id. at 288 (Jackson, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment did not incorporate the First
Amendment).
225. Id. at 284 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
226. Id. at 299–301 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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incitement. That element, for criminal cases, could be supplied by the actual malice element that I suggested earlier for
public defamation or the scienter element Justice O’Connor re228
quired in Virginia v. Black. A close assessment of the dissents, therefore, indicates that eight of nine justices agreed
that Illinois had a public reason for prohibiting group defamation. Justice Douglas specifically tied reputational harms to the
threat of physical harm; thereby implicitly linking restraints on
229
group defamation and true threats.
227. See id. at 279, 283 (Reed, J., dissenting) (stating that the right to free
speech can be abridged “when speech becomes an incitement to crime,” but the
relevant criminal statute must “be reasonably well defined”). Justice Reed’s
test is close to the one that the Court later adopted in Virginia v. Black. See
supra text accompanying notes 104–09.
228. See supra text accompanying notes 104–06.
229. This use of terminology is, of course, anachronistic. Watts, the initial
source of the true threats doctrine, was not decided until seventeen years after
Beauharnais. Compare Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969), with
Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952). Nevertheless, I think my point
about Douglas’s sense that intentional threats are linked to group defamation
is analytically correct.
Sociological studies bear this point out. Renowned psychologist Gordon W.
Allport described how “prolonged and intense verbal hostility always precedes
a riot.” GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 60 (1979). Preconceived animosities are intrinsic to hate crimes. Since medieval times, mobs
have often accused Jews of kidnapping Christian children, crucifying them,
and using their blood as an ingredient in Passover matzah. MAX I. DIMONT,
JEWS, GOD AND HISTORY 240–41 (2d ed. 2004); RAPHAEL ISRAELI, POISON:
MODERN MANIFESTATIONS OF A BLOOD LIBEL 21 (2002). This myth and other
antisemitic propaganda were often repeated to incite nationalistic mobs. EMIL
MURAD, THE QUAGMIRE 252 (1998); TADEUSZ PIOTROWSKI, POLAND’S HOLOCAUST: ETHNIC STRIFE, COLLABORATION WITH OCCUPYING FORCES AND GENOCIDE IN THE SECOND REPUBLIC, 1918–1947, at 135 (1998).
On the North American continent, aborigines were commonly reputed to
be brutal savages who killed frontier people, and this pernicious stereotype
was used to rationalize land misappropriation. BEN KIERNAN, BLOOD AND
SOIL: A WORLD HISTORY OF GENOCIDE AND EXTERMINATION FROM SPARTA TO
DARFUR 318–30 (2007). Lynch mobs in the United States were often riled up
by allegations of arson, or that a black man had raped a white woman or a
black man had argued with a white man. JAMES H. MADISON, A LYNCHING IN
THE HEARTLAND: RACE AND MEMORY IN AMERICA 67–68 (2001); STEWART E.
TOLNAY & E.M. BECK, A FESTIVAL OF VIOLENCE: AN ANALYSIS OF SOUTHERN
LYNCHINGS, 1882–1930, at 47 (1995). These accusations were unquestioned by
riotous crowds of individuals or white Southern men inside and outside the
legal system. Peter W. Bardaglio, Rape and the Law in the Old South: “Calculated to Excite Indignation in Every Heart”, 60 J. S. HIST. 749, 752 (1994);
James W. Vander Zanden, The Ideology of White Supremacy, 20 J. HIST. IDEAS
385, 401 (1959). During the Second World War Japanese Americans living on
the West Coast were interned after being labeled spies who were inimical to
the United States’ war efforts. JACOBUS TENBROEK ET AL., PREJUDICE, WAR
AND THE CONSTITUTION 262–65, 302 (1954); TSESIS, DESTRUCTIVE MESSAGES,
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Professor Jeremy Waldron, who has recently argued that
230
U.S. law should permit the regulation of group defamation,
has raised pragmatic doubt about whether the current members of the Court would uphold the conviction of Joseph Beau231
harnais. He may well be correct, but that question is unanswerable without a litigant bringing a direct challenge. What
we know is that regular citations to the case in majority opinions indicate that at least several justices continue to regard
232
Beauharnais to be good law. Waldron is correct that the need
to regulate defamation is ultimately a question of principle, not
merely doctrinal consistency. Existing doctrine, I believe, allows for the regulation of group defamation when it threatens
233
public safety.
D. MATERIAL SUPPORT OF TERRORISTS
Given this jurisprudential trajectory, it was logical for the
Court in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project to uphold a fedsupra note 130, at 102. Democratic processes in states like California and
Washington were hijacked by anti-Japanese groups who lobbied for the enforcement of discriminatory laws and internment. ROGER DANIELS, ASIAN
AMERICA: CHINESE AND JAPANESE IN THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1850, at 116–
19, 138 (1988). The democratic electoral system was also no barrier in Rwanda, where genocide followed repeated radio statements calling for the extermination of the Tutsi minority. Alison Des Forges, Call to Genocide: Radio in
Rwanda, 1994, in THE MEDIA AND THE RWANDA GENOCIDE 41, 42–43 (Allan
Thompson ed., 2007); Darryl Li, Echoes of Violence: Considerations on Radio
and Genocide in Rwanda, in THE MEDIA AND THE RWANDA GENOCIDE 90, 97–
98 (Allan Thompson ed., 2007).
230. JEREMY WALDRON, THE HARM IN HATE SPEECH 4 (2012) (arguing that
hate speech undermines the “sense of security in the space we all inhabit”).
231. See id. at 64 (quoting Judge Posner that “no one thinks that the First
Amendment would today be interpreted to allow group defamation to be prohibited” (citing Nuxoll ex rel. Nuxoll v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist., 523 F.3d 668,
672 (7th Cir. 2008))).
232. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383 (1992) (affirming
that speech can be limited in certain circumstances where that freedom is
outweighed by moral considerations); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 70
(1964) (recognizing that group vilification which could lead to public disorder
may not be protected under the First Amendment).
233. Waldron emphasizes that hate speech harms the targeted person’s
dignitary interests. WALDRON, supra note 230, at 103. The scope of this Article
does not allow me to expand on his thesis. Ultimately, I believe that hate
speech and group defamation are actionable because they attack more than
dignitary interests. Hate speech is essential to catalyzing mass discrimination
and violence. In a previous article, I demonstrated this point through notorious, historical examples. Alexander Tsesis, The Empirical Shortcomings of
First Amendment Jurisprudence: A Historical Perspective on the Power of Hate
Speech, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 729, 741–59 (2000).
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eral statute prohibiting anyone from providing “material support or resources” to groups the Secretary of State designated
234
as foreign terrorist organizations. The challenge was brought
by U.S. nonprofit organizations that sought to provide the
Kurdish Workers’ Party and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam with training about international law, political partici235
pation, and international organization. At face value, these
activities were not outrageous and arguably involved no direct
incitement. The Court found the context of transmitting infor236
mation to dangerous terrorists to be determinative.
The statute implicated public safety and free speech concerns. As part of its definition of material support, the law restricted an individual’s expressive right to provide “expert ad237
vice or assistance” to any designated organization.
A
factfinder inquiring into whether a defendant engaged in prohibited communication with a designated terrorist organization
must evaluate the content of the communication to determine
238
whether it falls under the material support statute. What
may be advice in some circumstances may be no more than
mass-advertisement-gone-to-the-wrong-address in another.
Think, for instance, of an individual who specifically addresses
an advisory pamphlet about the art of negotiation to a terrorist
group as opposed to an individual who inadvertently sends a
mass mailing about negotiations to the terrorist organization
along with a slew of other recipients. Under the statute, only
234. 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2730 (2010). It is a felony to knowingly provide, attempt, or conspire to provide “material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization.” 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a) (2006). The statute defined “material
support or resources” to include “property, tangible or intangible, or service,
including currency or monetary instruments or financial securities, financial
services, lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, safehouses, false documentation or identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons,
lethal substances, explosives, personnel . . ., and transportation, except medicine or religious materials[.]” § 2339A(b)(1).
235. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2716.
236. See id. at 2724–25 (finding that there is no way to distinguish between
helping terrorist groups with legitimate activities compared to illegal terrorist
activities).
237. § 2339B(g)(4). Among the groups designated terrorist organizations
are Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, Al-Qa’ida, HAMAS, Hizballah, Jemaah Islamiya
Organization, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, Palestine Liberation Front,
Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the Real IRA. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, FOREIGN
TERRORIST ORGS., available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/
45323.pdf.
238. See Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2720 (“Of course, the
scope of the material-support statute may not be clear in every application.”).
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the former conduct is actionable because the content is advisory
rather than commercial.
To limit the risk of wrongful convictions, Congress included
a mental state component in the material support statute. No
violation could occur unless the person providing the support
had “knowledge of the foreign group’s designation as a terrorist
239
organization or the group’s commission of terrorist acts.” Anyone knowingly contributing to a terrorist group was subject to
fifteen years in prison or up to life imprisonment if death re240
sulted from such support. HLP, then, dealt with a law entirely different than the outrage laws found unconstitutional in
241
Snyder and Entertainment Merchants.
In HLP, as with true threats and group defamations deci242
sions I assessed earlier,
the public welfare concerns were
grave enough to counterbalance the interest in self-expression.
As with the other two categories, in HLP the Court did not rely
on strict scrutiny analysis, with its demand for narrow tailor243
ing. The limits on speech in the context of all three categories, indicates that scholars like Eugene Volokh are mistaken
to assert that HLP is the “only non-overruled majority opinion
upholding a content-based speech restriction under strict scru244
tiny.” HLP is not alone in upholding a restriction on content
based restraints against incitement tending to create public
disorder and violence. Black was about the power of a state to
punish intentional threats relying on menacing symbols like
245
burning crosses, Beauharnais was about the power of the
state to punish the use of racist and antisemitic statements to
239. Id. at 2715.
240. § 2339B(a)(1).
241. See supra text accompanying notes 60–64.
242. See supra Part III.B (assessing the doctrine of true threats); Part III.C
(assessing the doctrine of group defamations).
243. The dissent explicitly made this point. Humanitarian Law Project, 130
S. Ct. at 2734 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[W]here, as here, a statute applies
criminal penalties and at least arguably does so on the basis of content-based
distinctions, I should think we would scrutinize the statute and justifications
‘strictly’—to determine whether the prohibition is justified by a ‘compelling’
need that cannot be ‘less restrictively’ accommodated.”).
244. Eugene Volokh, Humanitarian Law Project and Strict Scrutiny, THE
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 21, 2010, 1:28 PM), http://volokh.com/2010/06/21/
humanitarian-law-project-and-strict-scrutiny/ [hereinafter Volokh, HLP Post
1] (subsequently updated in Eugene Volokh, Speech That Aids Foreign Terrorist Organizations, and Strict Scrutiny, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 21,
2010, 5:43 PM) http://www.volokh.com/2010/06/21/speech-that-aids-foreign
-terrorist-organizations-and-strict-scrutiny/ [hereinafter Volokh, HLP Post 2]).
245. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 358, 360 (2003).
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246

defame groups, and HLP involved expert advice for empower247
ing terrorist organizations : all of these subjects are contentrich.
Volokh also reads narrow tailoring into the HLP majority’s
248
opinion, something that even the dissent did not do. The closest the Court came to this formulation was to adopt an amorphous “more rigorous scrutiny” than the intermediate scrutiny
249
test. Even assuming that Volokh is correct and this is an alternative formulation, albeit an ambiguous one, of strict scrutiny, the majority would likely nevertheless view the public danger of legitimizing terror to be compelling. Criminal liability
arises from only “a narrow category of speech to, under the direction of, or in coordination with foreign groups that the
250
speaker knows to be terrorist organizations.” The majority
found that the fungibility of money in a terrorist organization’s
control, with no “firewalls” preventing charitable contributions
251
from being funneled toward violent activities, rendered the
complete bar of material support narrow under the circumstances. Even seemingly benign support for an organization
252
could further its ability to wreak violent, political havoc. Advice given about leverage through dialogue, which is what Humanitarian Law Project sought to provide, could therefore
strengthen a terrorist organization’s ability to make demands
at the negotiation table. Although the specific advice the Hu246. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 252, 258–59.
247. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2715, 2730 (majority opinion).
248. See Volokh, HLP Post 1, supra note 244 (“I’m inclined to say that this
is indeed [narrowly tailored]—especially since the Court’s precedents call for
strict scrutiny of content-based speech restrictions—though the dissent reasonably notes that the majority is not entirely clear on this.”). But see Volokh,
HLP Post 2 (noting that the “Court doesn’t really define the test precisely” and
questioning whether the speech restriction is narrowly tailored). In his dissent
Justice Breyer did the opposite, at one point challenging the majority’s assumption that strict scrutiny does not apply. Humanitarian Law Project, 130
S. Ct. at 2734 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[E]ven if we assume for argument’s sake that ‘strict scrutiny’ does not apply, no one can deny that we must at the
very least ‘measure the validity of the means adopted by Congress against
both the goal it has sought to achieve and the specific prohibitions of the First
Amendment.’”).
249. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2723–24 (majority opinion).
250. Id. at 2723.
251. Id. at 2725–26.
252. See infra note 267 (discussing why the fungible nature of money
makes any, including ostensibly peaceful, contribution to terrorist organizations likely to increase terror activities).
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manitarian Law Project sought to provide terrorists was not directly translatable into violence, the Court found ample evidence that “material support of a terrorist group’s lawful activities facilitates the group’s ability to attract ‘funds,’ ‘financing,’
253
and ‘goods’ that will further its terrorist acts.”
Viewed in concert, the holdings in Black, Beauharnais, and
HLP indicate that the Court is deferential to the regulation of
speech for a limited number of public safety purposes. The public safety policies involved in these three cases were inapplicable to the offensive speech cases reviewed in Part I of this Article. HLP did differ from the other two incitement cases in its
reference to a “more rigorous scrutiny” while never adopting
any comparable standard for proving up group defamations or
254
true threats. This distinction is logical because material support might involve discourse that is not harmful on its face, albeit increasing organizations’ standing and credibility, while
true threats and group defamations are by definition menacing
to the public at large or some targeted segment thereof. Thus,
the greater potential for error and abuse in the enforcement of
material support statutes required a heightened level of scrutiny that would be unfitting for the other two categories.
Contrary to my doctrinal understanding of these cases,
Professor David Cole criticizes HLP for being out of step with
255
precedent. Cole has a unique interest in HLP outside the
realm of academic discourse: he argued the case on behalf of
256
the Humanitarian Law Project before the Supreme Court.
Curiously, Cole and Volokh seek to distinguish the holding in
257
HLP from an earlier one in Citizens United. In Citizens United, the Court relied on strict scrutiny analysis to overturn a
federal restriction on independent corporate expenditures with258
in a statutorily proscribed period of time. Cole inaccurately
253. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2726 n.6.
254. See id. at 2723–24.
255. David Cole, The Roberts Court v. Free Speech, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS,
Aug. 19, 2010, at 80, 81.
256. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2712.
257. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 886, 898 (2010); Cole, supra
note 255, at 81 (“In Citizens United, the Court imposed a heavy burden of justification on the government, and required solid evidentiary support for all
justifications that the government offered. . . . By contrast, in Humanitarian
Law Project, the Court upheld the material support law based on justifications
that were unsupported by evidence . . . .”).
258. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 886, 898. The strict scrutiny test is composed of two parts. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 774–
75 (2002) (“Under the strict-scrutiny test, respondents have the burden to
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asserts that “[t]he two decisions purported to apply the same
259
First Amendment standard.” Volokh also believes HLP is not
in line with Citizens United’s strong protection of speech
260
against government regulation. To begin, both of these schol261
ars read the strict scrutiny standard into HLP. That stand262
ard is explicit in Citizens United, but not in HLP. Indeed, it is
the contrast between the rigorous application of the standard in
the former and the total absence of it in the latter that belies
the purported symmetry between the two. Both scholars also
seem to overlook that content—one supporting mass murder for
political gain and the other campaign speech in a nonviolent
political contest—does matter in judicial analysis of public safety and free speech claims.
The problem, then, is not that the Court neglected to follow
the Citizens United precedent, but rather that the case is inapposite to HLP. Cole and Volokh neglect to even mention the
comparison between HLP and Black. Granted, the majority in
HLP also made no reference to the opinion from Black. The link
is nevertheless logical because Black dealt with a symbolic ex263
pression tied to a domestic terror group, the Ku Klux Klan,
264
and HLP was about foreign terrorist groups. Citizens United,
on the other hand, involved corporate speech in support of po-

prove that the announce clause is (1) narrowly tailored, to serve (2) a compelling state interest.”); see also Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301–02 (1993) (asserting that substantive due process “forbids the government to infringe certain ‘fundamental’ liberty interests . . . unless the infringement is narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling state interest.”).
259. Cole, supra note 255, at 80.
260. See Volokh, HLP Post 1, supra note 244 (noting that Citizens United
overruled Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990) which,
before Humanitarian Law Project, was “[t]he only majority opinion until this
one that has upheld a content-based speech restriction”).
261. Cole, supra note 255, at 80 (“The Supreme Court found that both laws
restrict speech based on its content, and therefore had to undergo the Court’s
most demanding standard of review, known as ‘strict scrutiny.’”); Volokh, HLP
Post 1, supra note 244. But see Volokh, HLP Post 2, supra note 248 (“[I]t seems
to me that Humanitarian Law Project is endorsing a test for content-based
speech restrictions that is less restrictive (and thus, if I’m right, more speech
protective) than strict scrutiny.”).
262. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 898 (“Laws that burden political speech
are ‘subject to strict scrutiny,’ which requires the Government to prove that
the restriction ‘furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to
achieve that interest.’” (quoting FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449,
464 (2007))).
263. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 360 (2003).
264. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2713 (2010).
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265

litical campaigns unrelated to terror. While Humanitarian
Law Project sought to provide purportedly benign aid to groups
who espoused strategic terror, Citizens United was a nonprofit
organization providing support for a political party that engaged in non-violent democratic elections. The two are incongruous. In HLP and Black, domestic and international public
safety concerns, were critical to the judgments, while in Citizens United the Court decided to expand the liberty of speech in
matters of representative politics. The mens rea requirement in
the material support for terrorists statute appeared to be Congress’s effort to provide the necessary criminal element Justice
266
O’Connor had identified in her plurality opinion to Black.
The holding in HLP applies to the prosecution of any
statements or conduct that lends material support to known,
designated terrorists. Even support of terrorist groups that is
purportedly directed toward peaceful activities, such as negotiations, increases the availability of resources to perpetrate acts
267
of political violence. Contrary to the Court’s emphasis on public safety, Professor Timothy Zick takes a distinctly libertyenhancing point of view, arguing that the ban on funding
harms the communicative interest of individuals wishing to as268
sist designated foreign terrorist organizations. He regards
communication with overseas terror organizations to be a pro269
tected form of speech. His analogy between advisory contacts
265. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 900 (“The Court has thus rejected
the argument that political speech of corporations or other associations should
be treated differently under the First Amendment simply because such associations are not ‘natural persons.”’). I have argued elsewhere that Citizens United was wrongly decided on other grounds related to the representative nature
of political speech. See Tsesis, Self-Government, supra note 1, at 739–51.
266. Black, 538 U.S. at 363–64 (plurality opinion).
267. See Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev., 549 F.3d 685, 698
(7th Cir. 2008) (discussing how even relatively small contributions to a terrorist organization could aggregate to substantial support that enhances its ability to commit acts of terror); United States v. Afshari, 426 F.3d 1150, 1160
(9th Cir. 2005) (finding that aid to terror organizations is not pure speech because it can be just as readily be used for peaceful functions as for the procurement of weapons); Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130,
1136 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding that providing fungible funding for nonviolent
activities “frees up resources that can be used for terrorist acts”).
268. Timothy Zick, The First Amendment in Trans-Border Perspective: Toward a More Cosmopolitan Approach, 52 B.C. L. REV. 941, 947 (2011) [hereinafter Zick, First Amendment in Trans-Border Perspective] (“Decisions like
Humanitarian Law Project affect not only the ability of citizens at home to
reach across borders, but also the thousands of citizens abroad working on
peace-building efforts in places like Afghanistan.”).
269. Timothy Zick, Falsely Shouting Fire in a Global Theater: Emerging
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and associations with terrorist organizations, on the one hand,
and constitutionally protected political speech and truth seek270
ing, on the other, overlooks the special public safety concerns
raised by foreign terror groups’ recruitment and planning activ271
ities in the United States. Advisory support given to a designated terrorist organization is not like protected communication in the marketplace of ideas, but a form of conduct that
strengthens the political hand of an organization committed to
paramilitary attacks against civilian and/or military personnel.
Zick is no doubt correct about the need for courts to consider
the transborder implications of regulations on global speech in
272
order to prevent constitutional violations, but he is mistaken
to argue that material support of terror organizations falls
within the ambit of traditional speech norms like truth seeking,
273
self-governance, and speaker autonomy.
Prohibiting the funding and communicative support for organizations that have not renounced mass violence is not a restraint on constitutionally protected expression. The statute at
issue in HLP, instead, seeks to prevent the intentional instigation of violence through back channel funding that is benign on
the surface. Like true threats, helping a terrorist organization
communicate more effectively before it has renounced political
violence, can empower it and enhance its ability to murder, inComplexities of Transborder Expression, 65 VAND. L. REV. 125, 157–58 (2012)
[hereinafter Zick, Falsely Shouting Fire] (arguing that Humanitarian Law
Project may be a “very bad precedent” because its recognition of statutory limits on communications with transborder terror organizations “is arguably inconsistent with several fundamental First Amendment principles,” such as
those protecting political speech and truth seeking).
270. Id. at 158 (comparing the restriction on association with terrorist organizations to ideological restrictions on “disfavored persons or groups” in the
early twentieth century).
271. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2725 (2010)
(“‘Material support’ is a valuable resource by definition. Such support frees up
other resources within the organization that may be put to violent ends. It also
importantly helps lend legitimacy to foreign terrorist groups—legitimacy that
makes it easier for those groups to persist, to recruit members, and to raise
funds—all of which facilitate more terrorist attacks.”).
272. Zick, Falsely Shouting Fire, supra note 269, at 177.
273. Id. at 178 (“Granting robust protection to transborder speech, association, and information distribution would serve a number of traditional free
speech values, including the facilitation of citizen self-governance, truth seeking, speaker autonomy, and checking governmental abuses of power wherever
they occur.”); id. at 183 (arguing that Humanitarian Law Project tends to
“chill the free flow of information” because a domestic newspaper making print
space available to a foreign terrorist group may be accused of providing “material support”).
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timidate, extort, and recruit.
The material support statute does not prevent individuals
from independently advocating on behalf of those organizations, so long as they do not act in concert with them or under
274
their direction. Just as Black did not prohibit membership in
the Klan, HLP does not prohibit individuals from pledging alle275
giance to an overseas terror organization. The statute simply
prevents the dissemination of funds and advice that increases
terrorists’ abilities to rely on alternative support for instigating
and committing acts of violence. “The criminalization of peaceful and legal speech that is coordinated with foreign terrorist
organizations” is not, as Zick claims, “inconsistent with both
traditional and cosmopolitan free speech principles favoring
276
open interaction and dialogue across borders.” To the contrary, foreign and domestic terrorist groups’ organizing principles
are coercive and intimidating, not discursive. Where public
safety is at stake, officials need not rely exclusively on “new
technologies to counter extremist speech in the global thea277
ter.” They can also turn to criminal laws like the material
support statute.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court reviews regulations on outrageous
speech very differently than it does the criminalization of intentionally intimidating statements. Offensive statements that
merely shock the conscience or even repulse audiences are protected by the First Amendment. In Entertainment Merchants
Ass’n and Snyder, the Supreme Court confirmed that the First
Amendment protects offensive and outrageous speech. The
Court has handled cases of public intimidation quite differently. The harms associated with intimidation are not merely emo274. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2726 (“Independent advocacy
that might be viewed as promoting the group’s legitimacy is not covered [by
the statute].”).
275. It is the intent of those burning the cross that is legally consequential,
not their affiliation. Indeed, the plurality explicitly stated that two of the defendants involved in the consolidated litigation “were not affiliated with the
Klan.” Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 358, 350 (2003) (plurality opinion); see also
Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2726 (arguing that because “[t]he
statute reaches only material support coordinated with or under the direction
of a designated foreign terrorist organization,” individual affiliation is not affected).
276. Zick, First Amendment in Trans-Border Perspective, supra note 268, at
1014.
277. Zick, Falsely Shouting Fire, supra note 269, at 178.
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tional or repulsive. There is a difference between someone
burning a cross to anger others and someone displaying it in
public to terrorize them. Contrary to the view embraced by
some scholars, when it comes to public intimidation even
speech that is not imminently dangerous can be curtailed.
When statements, emblems, badges, symbols, or other forms of
expression that are historically tied to persecution and harmful
stereotypes are intentionally used to put others in fear of violence, they are unprotected by the First Amendment.

